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Abstract 
This essay provides an analysis of the relation between entrepreneurship, taxes and 
institutions. Based on endogenous growth theory, the entrepreneur, as a provider of 
innovations, is expected to have an essential impact on economic growth. For the modern 
welfare state this raises the question on how to optimally tax entrepreneurial activity in order 
to minimize distortion effects, while stimulating growth. The most widely used proxy for 
entrepreneurship in the tax literature is self-employment. However, a large part of the 
empirical literature is based on single country analysis and fewer studies have been concerned 
with longitudinal cross-country comparisons. Using a relatively novel data set on harmonized 
self-employment rates, this thesis aims at contributing to the literature by further investigating 
the channels by which taxes affects self-employment in order to explain the large cross-
country variations in self-employment over time in OECD countries. Moreover, this study 
analyses, both theoretically and empirically, the joint effect of tax policies and institutional 
quality on self-employment, two aspects that the economic literature previously has 
investigated, though mostly in isolation. 
 
The effect of taxes is estimated using a panel data set on 17 OECD countries between 1982 
and 2008, using data on personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The main 
contribution of the study is the use of a relatively new harmonized measure of self-
employment, the use of both personal and corporate income taxes in an aggregated cross-
country setting as well as the inclusion of several measures of institutional quality. The results 
indicate that corporate income tax is the only tax that seems to have a significantly robust 
negative effect on self-employment, even though the effect is very small. The results also 
suggest that opposing effects of taxes may be explained by the degree of corruption in a 
country. In general, regulation of business, labour and credit seems to have a larger impact on 
self-employment relative to taxes.  
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
For a long time exogenous growth models formed the basis for empirical growth research. 
Within this framework technology is exogenously given implying that technological progress 
can not be explained; hence, long-run growth does not depend on economic conditions nor is 
it affected by government policy. The development of endogenous growth models made it 
possible to take into account long-term productivity growth and its endogenous determinants 
(Aghion & Howitt 2009, p. 13). 
In the second wave of endogenous growth models1, technological progress is 
explained as innovation driven (ibid, p.14-5). Even though the importance of the entrepreneur 
as a provider of innovation was pointed out already by Joseph Schumpeter in the early 20th 
century, innovation and entrepreneurship has been reintroduced to growth models quite 
recently. Within this framework, entrepreneurial activity generates innovation, boosts 
technological progress, and is therefore predicted to have an essential impact on economic 
growth. As globalization trends have contributed to larger firms relocating their production to 
low-cost countries, the importance of entrepreneurs and small businesses, as a provider of 
both innovation and employment, in high-cost countries have been stressed even further 
(Hansson 2008).  
The most widely used proxy for entrepreneurship is self-employment (ibid).2 
During the last ten years, in light of endogenous growth theory, the interest in self-
employment as a proxy for innovation has grown and so has the empirical research trying to 
identify its determinants.  For the modern welfare state this raises the question on how to 
optimally tax entrepreneurial activity in order to minimize distortion effects, while stimulating 
growth. However, until only a few years ago, relatively few studies had considered taxation as 
a factor influencing self-employment (Hansson 2012). Other institutional factors have only 
been considered even more recently (Nyström 2008). Both tax policy and other institutional 
factors, such as economic freedom, enforcement of property rights, rule of law and corruption 
have been investigated as they are assumed to be determinants of entrepreneurial incentives. 
The rational is that institutions, including taxes, are assumed to affect the expected profit of 
the entrepreneur (Hansson 2008). As a consequence, they will affect the individual labour 
choice between paid employment and self-employment. 
A large part of the empirical literature on self-employment is based on studies 
using national self-employment rates and fewer studies have been concerned with cross-
country comparisons. Still there are considerably large differences in self-employment rates 
even within the OECD (see figure 1 below), both as cross-section “snapshots” and over time, 
which becomes difficult to explain without cross-country comparisons (Robson and Parker 
2004). Furthermore, previous research has failed to offer consistent conclusions on how taxes 
affect self-employment (Stenkula 2009). Personal income taxes have turned out both positive 
and negative and not always significant, whereas corporate income tax has not until recently 
been considered. In addition, an unharmonized measure of self-employment has been used in 
several of the cross-country studies. 
This essay aims at contributing to this cross-country literature that investigates 
and tries to explain cross-sectional differences in self-employment rates within the OECD. It 
1 The first wave is usually referring to the AK-theory, see more in Aghion and Howitt (2009, p. 13). 
2 In the following essay ‘self-employed’ will be used interchangeably with ‘business owners’ and 
‘entrepreneurs’. However, a brief discussion on these possibly different concepts will follow in section 1.2. 
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does so by providing an analysis of the relation between self-employment, taxes and 
institutions. The main contribution to current research is the use of improved data with less 
measurement errors and a comprehensive analysis of different taxes as well as a joint analysis 
of taxes and the quality of institutions. As far as the author is aware of and has been able to 
found, no other aggregated cross-country study has previously investigated the effects of both 
personal and corporate income taxes. Furthermore, the use of an improved and harmonized 
measure of self-employment, that so far does not seem to have been used in tax research, 
gives motivation to revisit a few different channels of impact of taxes that the empirical 
literature have investigated with other measures. 
The first proposed hypothesis is that the data may reduce measurement errors 
present in previous research, and thereby be able to contribute to the literature on aggregate 
determinants. The second hypothesis to be investigated is that by acknowledging the impact 
of institutions, the same tax policy might generate different effects if the institutional 
conditions differ between countries. The first hypothesis will be considered in the baseline 
regression and the following extensions of the model, whereas the second hypothesis will be 
considered in one of the particular specifications which include an interaction term between 
taxes and an indicator on institutional quality. 
 
Figure 1. Self-employment rates in different OECD countries 1981-20083. 
 
Source: COMPENDIA (2013) 
1.1 Aim, general method and disposition 
Given the above, this thesis is both descriptive and explanatory. More specifically, this thesis 
will evaluate how taxes affect the level of entrepreneurial activity, while taking in to account 
institutional quality, in 17 OECD countries between the years 1982-2008. 
 Entrepreneurial activity, the dependent variable, will be measured by the rate of 
non-agricultural self-employed, as a percentage of the total labour force. In the next section 
1.2, the concepts of entrepreneurship and self-employment will be briefly introduced. The 
dependent variable will be regressed on the independent variables measuring personal income 
tax and corporate income tax together with indicators on institutions and other theoretically 
plausible determinants of entrepreneurial activity. Other taxes may also influence self-
employment, however, as a delimitation of the thesis, only personal income taxes and 
corporate income taxes will be considered. 
  Empirically, this thesis builds on previous studies of the determinants of self-
employment in order to construct a solid empirical model. One of the main contributions of 
this thesis is the use of a relatively new dataset on self-employment. In most previous cross-
3 Self-employment rates refer to the non-agricultural self-employed as a percentage of total labour force in each 
country. Further, the top rates refer to Italy, Greece and Portugal, whereas the lower rates are found in Denmark 
and Switzerland. Note that not all countries in the employed sample are represented in this figure (some 
countries with rates in the middle are omitted for clarity of presentation).  
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country studies the measure of self-employment used, has been drawn from the OECD 
Labour Statistic database (used in Robson and Wren (1999), Fölster (2002) and Parker and 
Robson (2004) for example). However, this data has been gathered from countries with 
different definitions of self-employment, hence this indicator is not suitable for cross-country 
comparisons, as it may introduce severe measurement errors (Fölster 2002). To address this, 
this thesis will use self-employment data from the COMPENDIA database (EIM Business and 
Policy Research 2013) which has been constructed with the specific purpose of constructing 
comparable statistics within the OECD. Nevertheless, this new and harmonized data has yet 
not been used in order to confirm the findings of earlier aggregate studies of taxes on self-
employment, as far as the author has been able to find.  
 Econometrically, panel data allows the researcher to take into account of both 
individual heterogeneity and dynamic effects which is not possible in cross-country studies. A 
least square dummy variable (LSDV) model will be employed as a baseline model as to 
control for this and further investigation in the relation between self-employed, taxes and 
institutions will be pursued by allowing for dynamic, non-linear effects and interaction terms. 
The paper is laid out as follows: the first chapter ends with a short introduction 
to the key concepts self-employment and entrepreneurship. Chapter two contains an outline of 
the theoretical and empirical determinants of self-employment. Based on this theoretical and 
empirical framework, the empirical part of the thesis, chapter three, begins with a description 
of the chosen data which is followed by a discussion of the empirical strategy as well as other 
methodological considerations. The results are presented and elaborated on in chapter four 
whereas a discussion of the results and concluding remarks are found in chapter five.  
Descriptive statics and regression outputs are found in the appendix. 
1.2 Defining the concepts- what is an entrepreneur? 
For a long time there were almost no entrepreneurs in the models used by neoclassical 
economists. Recent years of theoretical and empirical research has shown that this now is 
changing and as a parallel development there are many policymakers who have come to see 
entrepreneurs as the solution to both unemployment and weak economic performance 
(Henrekson 2007). For a formal presentation, assume that the domestic output can be 
described by the Cobb-Douglas production function GDP = Y = AKαL(1-α), where output per 
capita implies: 
𝑦 =  𝐴𝑘𝛼   where k= K/L (1) 
Given that economic growth is the growth rate of output per person and assuming equal 
growth rate in labour and population the growth rate (g) can be expressed as4: 
 
 𝑔 =  𝑦
𝑦
̇ =  ?̇? +  𝛼 𝑘
𝑘
̇  ,  where ?̇? = ?̇? 𝐴⁄  (2) 
The importance of entrepreneurs will formally be captured within the term ?̇?, as 
entrepreneurial activity is expected to generate innovations that increase productivity within 
the economy5. Hence, taxation related to entrepreneurial activity would also be captured by 
4 Given by taking the natural logarithm of (1) and then differentiating with respect to time, where ?̇?
𝑦
 equal 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑡
𝑦
. 
5 In the Schumpeterian endogenous growth model the innovation process is, in short, described as the outcome of 
each period where there is an entrepreneur that has the opportunity to attempt an innovation. Given a successful 
innovation, a new version of an intermediate product (used to produce final goods) is created that is more 
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this term (Aghion and Howitt 2009, p. 87-88, 106, Lee and Gordon 2005). However, research 
on entrepreneurship and innovation is still fairly new in academia and this may be the reason 
for why entrepreneurship, despite its possible importance, still represents an elusive concept 
(Henrekson 2007). Yet, I will try to make a very short and general summary of the concepts in 
order to guide the discussion in the following chapters. 
Usually, different definitions of entrepreneurship typically refer to (the creation 
of) new, usually small, businesses. These businesses are owned and managed by individuals 
that usually are assumed be innovative in their business approach and accept some degree of 
risk in their business venture (Bruce and Schuetze 2004). In chapter three the data will be 
described, including the dependent variable. However, related to the definition of self-
employed, is that the measure employed in this study includes both unincorporated and 
incorporated business owner/managers. 
Henrekson (2007) argues that entrepreneurship “almost always entails an 
ambition to grow”.  He defines entrepreneurship as individuals and organizations that actively 
contribute to renewal and change in the economy which implies both creation of opportunity 
and response to the existing environment while embracing risk of an uncertain outcome. 
Entrepreneurs can hence be described both as rent-seekers and risk-takers. Given the broad 
definition, individuals that choose to enter entrepreneurship, may cause activities to be 
“productive, unproductive or even destructive from a societal perspective” (ibid, p. 3), that is, 
not necessary positive innovative ventures. 
Lastly, related to the discussion of elusive definitions is the discussion of 
measuring such innovative activity generated by an entrepreneur.  In most empirical studies 
the measure that has been used is the number of individuals who report working for 
themselves, which quite closely matches the “self-employed” classification. Nonetheless, self-
employed includes individuals engaged in widely varying activities, including those who 
operate as franchisers, as an example. Franchiser may encounter some risk but as they are 
following a stylized approach and strategy within the chain they are most likely not to be as 
innovative as other “self-made” entrepreneurs (Bruce and Schuetze 2004). Other non-
entrepreneurial motives to be self-employed may be to pursue a certain lifestyle, to 
circumvent discrimination on the labour market or to be able to avoid taxes or heavy 
regulation.  This is why the measurement may overstate the amount of entrepreneurial 
activity. On the other hand, this measure excludes individuals engaged in innovative behavior 
within established firms, hence the measure may also be too narrow. Moreover, illegal 
activities as motives to be self-employed, may be ambiguous, as evasive activities might seem 
necessary for individuals or firms that strives to be productive, in circumstances where the 
market is excessively regulated or taxed (Henrekson 2007).  
However, in keeping with the notation of most of the previous literature, I use 
the terms entrepreneurship, self-employed and business owners interchangeably throughout 
the remainder of the paper.  
 
 
productive than the previous version. The innovation process is random and hence will growth be random. As 
the growth rate can be shown to be proportional to the productivity affected by the innovations of entrepreneurs, 
in the long run the economy’s average growth rate is equal to the frequency times the size of the innovations. As 
new innovations that cause economic growth also makes the previous technologies obsolete, this refers to the 
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” (Aghion and Howitt 2009, p. 85-87).  
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Chapter two 
Theoretical and empirical framework 
This chapter is divided in two main parts. The first part, section 2.1 to 2.4, will review the 
theoretical literature on the determinants of self-employment in order to shape the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. The second section, section 2.5, is devoted to previous empirical 
research which aims at complementing the discussion on theoretical determinants.  
Even though the interest in entrepreneurship as a unique factor in the modern 
economy has grown, the concept of entrepreneurship is of a multifaceted nature (Nyström 
2008) and this may be the reason for why there is no coherent and general agreed upon formal 
model. The one used in this thesis will therefore be extrapolated from different theoretical and 
empirical papers. However, in order to structure this theoretical section, this part will in broad 
brushstrokes be structured as a model where the decision to become self-employed is 
dependent on the costs and alternative costs of being self-employed.  
2.1 Entrepreneurial income and entry 
How entrepreneurship is affected by taxes may be explained by looking at how the 
entrepreneurial income is affected by taxes. Entrepreneurs are often described and analyzed as 
rent seekers which imply an attempt to reap rewards in excess of the level determined in 
competitive equilibrium or rates exceeding the risk-adjusted market rate of return, i.e. they try 
to create or discover economic rents. This rent may be obtained through productive or 
unproductive entrepreneurial activities: introducing a new innovation in the form of a superior 
or more cost effective product, attaining a monopoly position when granted a government 
license or bribing an official to keep competitors out (Henrekson 2007). The specific 
compensation for effort of the self-employed usually comes in the forms of wages, dividends, 
sale of the business or a combination of these, which all may be taxed differently (Stenkula 
2009) which give motives for study of several tax rates.  
Gentry and Hubbarb (2000) model the entry decision for an entrepreneur as a 
comparison between the incomes the potential entrepreneur expects as self-employed 
compared with income from paid-employment. The decision to become self-employed is 
taken if: 
 
𝜋𝑠𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼 −  𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 𝑤𝑖𝑡(𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡)  (3) 
This occurs when the potential entrepreneur receives a wage, w, when working for a firm that 
is lower than the expected return to entrepreneurship. The wage is based on education (e), 
experience (x) and other household characteristics (z). The left hand side is determined by the 
probability of success (πs), entrepreneurial ability (θi), investment (k) and the risk-free interest 
rate (r). The gross return from entrepreneurship, if successful, yields 𝜃𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑡𝛼 . This provides a 
picture of the theoretical micro-model of the entrepreneurial decision. Since this study 
investigates the aggregated determinants it will not be able to control for individual level 
factors such as ability, but the above model may illustrate the entry choice as determined by 
certain costs and alternative costs to self-employment. This gives structure for the next 
theoretical part. Further, this expression does not take into account the effects of taxes, but as 
will be discussed in the next section, taxes will affect both incentives and risks associated 
with the left hand side relative to the right hand side of this expression. 
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2.2 The effect of taxes  
Income taxes consist of personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. Personal income 
taxes are taxes on wages and possibly business income from unincorporated businesses 
whereas corporate income taxes are levied on the net return on incorporated businesses 
(Stenkula 2009, Bruce and Moshin 2006). These taxes and their trends within the context of 
OECD countries will be commented on in section 2.6 and they may affect individual behavior 
and the employment decision in different ways, both negatively and positively. In short, 
personal income taxes affect the return to all forms of labour which includes self-employment 
(Bruce and Moshin 2006); hence an intuitively negative effect may be expected. As parts of 
the incorporated businesses earnings may be partly taxed as earned income, this may have a 
negative effect on these businesses as well (Stenkula 2009). This relationship has generated 
more interest in the literature compared with corporate income taxes, which nevertheless 
affect the earnings of incorporated business income. These taxes may also have a combined 
impact on how new businesses will be organized in terms of incorporation or not (Bruce and 
Moshin 2006). 
The effect of taxes on entrepreneurship could therefore be a ‘simple’ one: since 
higher taxation reduces the level of profit opportunities, it reduces the expected income of the 
potentially self-employed and thus may reduce productive entrepreneurship. Following the 
previous vocabulary, taxes is then perceived as a cost of self-employment. Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Garello (2011) call this intuitive and straight forward negative labour supply effect the 
‘incentive’ effect. However, as will be demonstrated, economic theory actually implies 
ambiguous effects on the level of entrepreneurship.  
To start with, economic theory predicts different forms of impacts of marginal 
and average taxes. Marginal tax rates have an impact on the distortions introduced to 
individuals and firms choices, as they influence decisions concerning the amount of 
investments to undertake, additional income to earn, and entrepreneurial effort. It affects 
additional income on the margin; hence it may be argued that it will affect the “rate of 
success” for the self-employed. On the other hand, average taxes are predicted to influence 
the discrete choice to invest or supply effort at all (Hansson and Dackehag 2012).  
Robson and Wren (1999) construct a model on marginal and average taxes 
where they focus on two aspects of self-employment, which are said to differ from regular 
paid employment. First, self-employed are argued to have a greater sensitivity of pre-tax 
income to effort, due to the risk and second, by self-employment there is a greater opportunity 
to evade taxes on income. Here marginal and average tax rates have opposing effects on the 
supply of effort and evasion and thus on the labour choice between self-employment and paid 
employment6. An increase in marginal tax rates is expected to have a negative effect on self-
employment while an increase in average tax is expected to have the opposite effect, in this 
particular model. 
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) further points out that higher tax rates not only 
affects the expected return, but also the risk associated with self-employment. Unlike wage 
work, entrepreneurial income offers an uncertain return. Thus, both rents and risks need to be 
6 The intuition is that an increase in the marginal tax rate decreases the optimal level of effort and thus causes the 
individual to reduce effort as well as the level of evasion. However, the relative costs of this, in terms of the loss 
of expected post-tax income, are greater for self-employed in this model. Pre-tax income is more responsive to 
the reduction in effort in self-employment, but the benefit to the self-employed of being able to evade taxes is 
also reduced, as the level of evasion is lower. This is in contrast to the relation between an increase in the 
average tax rate that increases optimal levels of effort and evasion. Within this framework they model the 
individual problem of optimal level of effort and tax evasions that maximize the level of utility in each 
employment model (Robson and Wren 1999). 
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taken into account in order to understand the self-employment decision. Given this, taxation 
can make investment in the risky sector more or less attractive. 
The aspects of risk in the entrepreneurial income have been elaborated on in the 
context of the personal income tax as a progressive tax schedule. On the one hand, tax 
progressivity can lower entrepreneurship via the ‘incentives’ effect (reducing the size of profit 
opportunity). On the other hand, it can lead to an increase in entrepreneurship if risk adverse 
entrepreneurs perceive it as an insurance mechanism. The rational is that the progressive tax 
system, by providing loss offsets or because of lower marginal rate in case of entrepreneurial 
failure, may reduce the risk perceived by the potential self-employed, as a form of “risk-
sharing” with the government. Positive effects of tax progressivity, as in the case with tax 
rates, may also be due to the previous mentioned effects of tax avoidance (Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Garello 2011, Gentry and Hubbard, 2000).  
The negative incentive effect and the positive risk-sharing effect are 
theoretically applicable to the corporate income tax as well. Cullen and Gordon (2007) have 
made important contributions to this relatively late theoretical and empirical literature where 
both taxes are considered in a combined framework and actual incentives is thus affected by 
the relative rates between personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. Cullen and 
Gordon (2007) identify three channels by which the corporate income taxes affect self-
employment, in relation to personal income tax. First, since the corporate income tax often is 
lower than the personal income tax, this encourages the self-employed to incorporate his 
business and is referred to as a form of “income shifting”. Second, if higher risk-taking by the 
entrepreneur generates higher returns to entrepreneurship, the combination of progressive 
personal income tax and usually a flat corporate income tax creates a “risk-subsidy” for self-
employed if incorporating the business. These two channels increase incorporated self-
employment, if the corporate tax is reduced. The third channel refers to the already described 
“risk-sharing” channel. 
The taxes above were analyzed with the main assumption that higher taxes 
raises the costs of the potential income of the self-employed but positive channels were also 
briefly mentioned. One potential positive effect arises from tax evasion possibilities through 
self-employment. As self-employed reports their own income, it is easier to avoid tax by 
underreporting income for self-employed compared to employed individuals (Hansson 2008). 
Both theoretical and empirical evidence indicate that self-employed have plenty of 
opportunities to evade taxes, a reason for why tax policies that encourages entrepreneurial 
activity can be a “double edged sword” (Bruce and Schuetze 2004). A tax system that 
generates a desired increase in entrepreneurial activity by an increase in taxes in the wage 
sector raises the marginal benefit to self-employment for those wishing to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity, but also increases the marginal benefit to self-employment for those 
whose intent is tax evasion (ibid). Further, even with neutral taxes in all employment modes, 
the effective tax rate may be lower for self-employed business owners, due to the possibility 
to avoid or evade taxes which may encourage entrepreneurial activity without motives of 
innovations (Gentry and Hubbarb 2000). 
Given the above, it is clear that the expected sign of taxes are not given a priori 
to the empirical investigation in the next two chapters. 
2.3 Institutions, taxes and self-employment  
As institutions have shown to be important determinants for economic growth, it is most 
likely that they also have an important effect on entrepreneurship. Similar to taxes, institutions 
affect the potential return for the self-employed and thus the incentives for entrepreneurship 
(Hansson 2008). In this section I will describe the theoretical relationship further and it will 
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be concluded with a joint theoretical analysis of the effect of taxes on self-employment in the 
context of the institutional set-up. 
When defining what institutions are, one often refers to Douglas C. North, one 
of the most important contributors to institutional economics. North (1993b, p. 20- 21) argues 
that institutions affect all individual choices and thereby governs the whole economy, by 
incentive structures (“rules of the game”) that affect transaction costs for exchange and 
production. Thus, economic growth is not caused by factor accumulation, but initially by the 
incentives structure that encourage individuals to make productive investments. Similarly, 
where economic growth is absent or slow, North points to the explanation of destructive 
incentives rather than the lack of capital accumulation. The “rules of the game” are either 
formal or informal, where the former consists of political constitutions and regulation that 
enables financial freedom and ensures rule of law for example, while the latter consist of 
traditions, norms and codes of conduct that constitute cultural inheritance (North 1993a, p. 
16).  
Henrekson (2007) argues that entrepreneurship not per se is determined to be 
socially productive and stresses that institutions can determine how the entrepreneurial talent 
is channeled to productive, unproductive and even predatory activities. For example, the 
incentives structure may imply that the return to entrepreneurial effort is larger trying to 
circumvent institutions, by for example avoiding taxes, rather than benefiting from given 
institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance contracts when doing business. An example of 
formal institutions that reduce uncertainty and risk would be the protection of property. 
However, there might be ambiguous effects of different institutions as, on the other hand, 
excessive protection of property rights also may hamper productive entrepreneurship. The 
logic could be analogous to a tax on innovation; both the risk and expected expense associated 
with entrepreneurship rises sharply (if an innovator faces a high risk of being sued for 
infringement by other patent holders). In this situation, incentives promote business through 
large firms with financial strength relative to small start-ups.  
Lee and Gordon (2005) directly highlight the absence of rule of law, in terms of 
corruption, as a barrier to entry for small business owners. This is because the need to pay 
bribes to government officials in order to obtain needed licenses, imply a direct cost to self-
employment.  
As an extension, Torrini (2002) makes a connection between the effect of taxes 
and the presence of corruption. He argues that self-employed are more likely to be engaged in 
tax avoidance, the greater the toleration of irregular activities is, implying that positive effects 
of taxes are more likely to be found in countries with relatively high corruption. As a 
consequence, in countries where laws are more likely to be enforced, high taxation could 
instead discourage entrepreneurial activities.  
Given this combined analysis, for the second research question in this study, the 
hypothesis is that as institutions shape incentives it is possible that the same tax policy will 
generate different results depending on institutional differences in different countries.  
2.4 Other determinants of entrepreneurship  
In the empirical literature on the determinants of self-employment a division may be made 
between pull and push factors. An individual can either be pulled into self-employment in 
order to pursue a promising business opportunity (rather than having a paid job or being 
unemployed) or the individual can be pushed into it because no other option to make a living 
is available (Henrekson 2007). These factors may also be modeled as costs of self-
employment, but pull and push factors both refer to situations where the cost of self-
employment relative to other employment modes are lower, however with this definitions, 
8 
 
two different motives crystallizes. These factors can usually be divided in labour market, 
macroeconomic and demographical categories. 
Based on Evans and Jovanovic (1989), individuals are pulled into self-
employment on the basis of the expected returns to entrepreneurship relative to those earned 
in paid- or unemployment. However, another assumption within this framework is that entry 
into self-employment requires some form of wealth of the potential self-employment. Thus, 
where there are incomplete capital markets, self-employment is restricted to the ones with the 
necessary funds (or collateral) for start-up capital. Factors that influence access to finance 
and potential start-up capital are therefore likely to be important. Empirically, it has been 
confirmed that entrepreneurs tend to have more savings than other households and that access 
to finance is important in order to start up a new business (Henrekson 2007). Fölster (2002) 
highlights further that a tax-financed welfare system tends to reduce household savings which 
may negatively affect access to finance.  
A comprehensive welfare system is likely to be correlated with the size of the 
public sector. Davidsson and Henrekson (2002) have argued that a large size of the public 
sector also decreases the need for a private sector on the market where the public sector is 
offering services. This effect on the private market may hence have a negative effect of the 
number of self-employed. Hansson (2008) clarifies the analysis by pointing out the effect of 
taxes on self-employment most likely is dependent on what the tax revenues are spent on. 
This allocation can have impact on the incentives for the level of savings as well as on the 
incentives for the unemployed to find new employment opportunities. Large tax revenues may 
also be spent on strengthening institutions that foster productive self-employment and other 
business forms in general. 
A key alternative cost and (positive) push factor to self-employment may be the 
risk of unemployment. When unemployment is high the decision to become self-employed 
may be “the last option”.7 On the other hand, high unemployment may be related to low 
levels of demand, indicating a negative relationship. Parker and Robson (2004) call these 
channels the “recession push” versus the “prosperity pull”, explaining why unemployment in 
many studies is said to control for business cycles. Robson and Wren (1999) argue that a 
negative effect is plausible since the attractiveness of self-employment may rise when a well 
performing labour marked can act as a “cushion against failure” of the entrepreneur (i.e. if the 
entrepreneurial venture does not pay off the individual may be able to find a wage and salary 
employment). This corresponds to the potential “insurance” effect of taxes that was discussed 
in section 2.2, which stresses the need to incorporate the risk of entrepreneurship in the 
theoretical framework. 
Related to unemployment is the replacement rate, i.e. the level of 
unemployment benefits. If this level of benefits is high, i.e. the alternative cost is high, it 
might discourage self-employment. Moreover, if self-employed do not receive the same 
benefit entitlements as those in wage employment, high benefits may discourage paid 
employers to become self-employed in the first place (Parker and Robson 2004). A 
corresponding alternative cost is the real value of the minimum wage (Bruce and Moshin 
2006) or average wage as used in Stenkula (2009), which also may capture motives to become 
self-employed.  
Industrial composition has been discussed as a determinant of self-employment 
as it may affect the available opportunities for the potential self-employed. Control for the 
size of the service sector and the share of the labour force that is employed in the services 
sector has been included as to control for different business structures (Stenkula 2009). 
Another labour market characteristic is the share of female labour participation of the total 
7 This is usually referred to “necessity entrepreneurship”, where the prime motive to start a business is to make a 
living (Nyström 2008). 
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labour force that in many studies have been included, due to empirical evidence indicating 
that self-employment is more common among men than females (Parker and Robson 2004). 
Other demographical changes have also been controlled for in many studies. 
Bruce and Moshin (2006) control for median age and Fölster (2002) include a measure of the 
dependency ratio (share of population below 18 or above 65).These measures may capture 
tendencies in age groups who affect the rate of self-employment or capture effects on welfare 
expenditures that previously were discussed and linked to self-employment. 
Lastly, the aggregated income level in the economy may have an impact on self-
employment by different channels. Theoretically, higher per capita GDP might be negatively 
related to aggregate self-employment rates if it is associated with more capital per worker 
which may imply larger average firms. If the measure of self-employment captures a large 
group of necessity entrepreneurship, it is also plausible that the effect is negative, as found by 
Bjørnskov and Foss (2008). However, higher per capita GDP might have a positive impact on 
the demand within countries, which might (disproportionately) benefit the self-employed or it 
may stimulate available capital for the entrepreneur (Nyström 2008). Fölster (2002) argue that 
lower income levels may cause higher self-employment, due to less efficient distribution 
systems in these countries, which enables smaller shops to be established, that are typically 
managed by self-employed.  
2.5 Previous research 
Not only does the theoretical literature predict somewhat diverse effects of taxes on self-
employment, the empirical research has generated inconclusive result as well (Stenkula 2009). 
Many studies have found that higher tax rates lead to higher rates of entrepreneurial activity, 
while a number of more recent studies have questioned this general finding, finding both 
negative and non-significant effects (Hansson 2012). A short summary will follow of these 
results, with focus on studies that use similar methods or data. 
The effect of taxes on self-employment has been studied on different levels, 
with some variations in methods. One straight forward way to divide them, as done by 
Stenkula (2009), is along a micro- and a macro-line. As has been mentioned earlier, there 
have been few macro studies that have investigated aggregated cross-country differences in 
self-employment using longitudinal data. The main reason is the low quality of data on self-
employment (especially from OECD Labour Force Statistics) and problems with omitted 
variables and endogeneity (Hansson 2008). Lack of data has also been an issue (Parker and 
Robson 2004).  
Fölster (2002) studied how tax revenues over GDP as a measure of general tax 
burden affects self-employment in OECD countries and found a negative and significant 
relation. He, however, points out the risk of using OECD data as it suffers from measurement 
errors. Parker and Robson (2004) also studied OECD countries, but included average rates of 
personal income tax and employers’ social security contributions. They concluded that the 
emphasis on macroeconomic and demographic variables in previous studies appears to have 
been misplaced, as taxes seem to have the strongest impact. They claim that some of the 
dominant positive effect found in their and other studies may be partly explained by the fact 
that marginal income tax rates have been the same or similar for employees and the self-
employed in many countries. Therefore, labor supply effects of changing tax rates are similar 
in both occupations, while the effect of tax avoidance that is especially applicable to the self-
employed, generate the dominating positive effect. 
The timing of the effects of taxes and the potential short-run and/or long-run 
effect of taxes has also been partly investigated in the aggregated literature (using error-
correction models and cointegration techniques for example). Robson and Wren (1999) 
studied effective marginal and average taxes within OECD and found support for their 
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theoretical model that marginal tax negatively affect self-employment, while the average have 
a positive effect, as in Parker and Robson (2004), in both short run and in the long run. 
Stenkula (2009) used aggregated measures of different taxes and self-employment measures 
but in a 50 year long time series with Swedish data. He found that self-employment rates 
adapt slowly to changes in tax rates which he concludes is plausible since most people will 
not immediately start or stop being self-employed as a consequence to changes in the 
economic environment. He also found no significant effect of marginal income taxes and 
negative but small effects of payroll taxes and corporate taxes. His study was based on the 
analysis of Bruce and Moshin (2006) using US data. They were one of the first scholars to 
include corporate taxes in their analysis. They found that corporate income tax and personal 
income tax had a negative and a positive effect, respectively, though the significance 
depended on the measure of self-employment, and the effects were small. Only the corporate 
income tax rate was significant when more advanced statistical tests were performed. 
Bruce and Moshin (2006) and Stenkula (2009) used corporate tax rates, but the 
vast majority of the research has focused on personal income tax. As Da Rin et al (2011, p. 
1048) formulate it, corporate income tax is “a policy instrument that has received surprisingly 
little attention so far”. Djankov et al (2010) use a large novel micro data set covering 85 
countries in order to investigate the effect of corporate income tax on entrepreneurial activity, 
FDI and aggregated investment and find a relatively large negative effect of  taxes on 
entrepreneurial entry (a 10 percentage point increase of the tax decreases entry with 1,4 
percentage points). Nonetheless, this was a pure cross-country study for one year. Da Rin et al 
(2011) add to this literature by using firm level micro data in 17 countries over 8 years. They 
also find a negative effect, but below a certain tax level. Above a certain level the positive 
“risk-sharing” effect seem to dominate. Djankov et al (2010) and Da Rin et al (2011) also 
recognize the importance of regulation, security of property rights among other to control for 
the effects of taxes. These are examples of micro data studies has generated a lot of interest in 
recent years, when more detailed individual data has become available. Many micro data 
studies have questioned earlier positive effects captured by aggregated data but this data is 
still claimed to find less conclusive results, i.e. not as positive as earlier aggregated data, but 
still without possibility to generate consensus on a negative effect (Bruce and Moshin 2006). 
While corporate income tax has been used in these micro data studies and top 
statutory corporate taxes have been used in single country studies (Bruce and Moshin 2006, 
Stenkula 2009) it has not, as far as the author has been able to found, been used in a cross-
country study. This thesis adds to this literature.8  
In addition to the timing of the tax effect, the linear form of the effect has also 
been studied. For example, Georgellis and Wall (2006) allowed for a non-linear effect of the 
marginal income tax on the basis that assuming a non-trivial cost of being caught evading 
taxes, the incentives to evade will be higher for higher tax rates. This may cause a non-linear 
effect where the negative labour supply effect (the “incentive effect”, according to previously 
vocabulary) dominates at lower tax rate, while a positive effect may be found at higher rates. 
In a dataset on 50 American states for 8 years they found support for this. De Mooij and 
Nicodeme (2007) also found support for this with corporate income tax in a large micro data 
set and so did Da Rin et al (2011). 
8 It has been used, together with other top statutory tax rates, in studies on economic growth as the dependent 
variable. For example, Lee and Gordon (2005) investigate this relation with motivation on previous studies on 
taxes and entrepreneurship. If entrepreneurship generates growth, a similar relationship should prevail between 
taxes and growth. They conclude however, that the aggregated information in their study provides insufficient 
information on the precise links between taxes and growth. This thesis, using similar tax measures as Lee and 
Gordon (2005) might hence be seen as a further investigation of this link. 
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Related to this, is the research of Torrini (2002) who is one of few who has 
studied self-employment from a joint tax and institutions perspective on an aggregated level. 
Torrini (2002) argues that given the persistence of self-employment rates across countries, 
variables that show little variability over time are likely to be important explanatory factors. 
Hence, institutional characteristics become natural candidates as they are relatively stable 
over time, however, still different between countries. This is also the motivation to a recent 
study of self-employment with respect to institutions by Nyström (2009). Using panel data on 
OECD countries between1972-2002 she found that smaller government sector, better legal 
structure and security of property rights and less regulation of credit, labour and business 
seem to have a positive impact on self-employment, though this analysis was in isolation of 
taxes. 
Da Rin et al (2011) pursue a very similar theoretical argument as Torrini (see 
section 2.2.3) when they investigate if the relationship between corporate income taxes and 
entry rates (on firm level) are constant or dependent on what they call “institutional 
infrastructure”. They operationalize it by tax accounting standards and divide his sample with 
dummies for “god” and “bad” standards. They find that the negative effect of increased 
corporate income is smaller in countries with “bad” standards and conclude that this is an 
effect of greater possibility for tax evasion in these countries. Torrini (2002) investigated five 
institutional variables, including one tax measure: public sector size, labour and product 
market regulation indicators, tax and social contribution wedge and corruption, where the 
latter is said to capture “law enforcement and the general attitude towards illegal activities” 
(ibid, p. 15). He also found differences in the impact of the tax wedge on self-employment 
when he interacted this wedge with the corruption dummy. Nonetheless, as his data on self-
employment rate also suffered from measurement errors and as a lack of data prevented him 
to use many control variables in his panel data specification, this makes it relevant to revisit 
this study in order to expand and possibly verify the result. For this purpose, the perceived 
levels of corruption in the sample are shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Perception of corruption in OECD countries 1981-20089. 
 
Source: CANA database 2011 
 
 
2.6 The context of OECD countries 
For the business owner, globalization has made it possible to relocate the business in another 
country to take advantage of more favorable fiscal environments (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Geller 2011). Overall, globalization has put pressure on the tax rates and system of developed 
9 The indicator consists of an index on a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 equal no perception of corruption. Further, 
the top rates refer to Denmark and New Zeeland, whereas the lower rates are found in Greece and Italy. Note 
that not all countries in the employed sample are represented in this figure (some countries with rates in the 
middle are omitted for clarity in presentation). 
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countries, when the international flow of capital and labour has increased. However, personal 
income taxes and corporate income taxes are together the largest source of taxes in OECD. 
Since they roughly represent 35 percent of the overall tax incomes and have done so during 
the last decades (OECD Tax Database, 2014), these taxes are likely to represent a substantive 
amount of the taxes affecting self-employed. The delimitation of the thesis is hence 
motivated. In the graph below the trend in the top statutory taxes since 1981 is shown. 
 
Figure 3. Trend in average top statutory tax rates in OECD, 1981-2008 
 
Source: OECD Tax Database (2014), own calculations on the employed sample 
 
A wave of tax reforms took place in the 1980s and evened out many differences between the 
OECD countries in their tax schedules. Following these reforms, steep declines in top rates of 
personal income during the 1980s is one of the most notable changes over the last three 
decades.  
When some convergence in different tax rates has taken place, self-employment 
rates have remained different between countries (as seen in figure 1 in chapter 1).The latter 
imply an argument for including slow-moving institutional variables into the analysis (Torrini 
2002). Average income tax rates have also decreased on average among the OECD countries, 
but less dramatically compared with the top statutory income tax rates. 
Figure 4: Trend in average income tax rates in OECD, 1981-2004 
 
Source: OECD Tax Database (2014), own calculations on the employed sample 
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Chapter three 
Empirical model  
The aim of this study is to evaluate how taxes affect the level of entrepreneurial activity, 
while taking in to account institutional quality, in the OECD. This chapter gives a description 
of the chosen data, the empirical model and other methodological considerations. 
3.1 Data 
To assess the questions of the thesis I rely on a variety of data sources. The combination of 
these datasets is unique in the literature. The choice of the variables are based on what was 
discussed in the theoretical section and on what has been used in previous research as 
operationalization of theory. Detailed descriptions of the data and their sources can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable: self- employed business owners 
Data on the dependent variable self-employment rate (semp) will be collected from the 
COMPENDIA database (EIM Business and Policy Research 2013) and refers to the number 
of self-employed in relation to the total labour force. The chosen measure will exclude self-
employment in agriculture, hunting and forestry, as is usually done in the research. The 
rational is that these sectors have gone through significant structural changes throughout the 
end of the 20th century in most European countries, a development that has little to do with 
taxes (Stenkula 2009). These sectors are also argued to be influenced by historically and 
culturally determined traditions of family ownership and less by other factors that influence 
self-employment rates in the rest of the economy (Parker and Robson 2004).  
The business ownership rates in the COMPENDIA database has been gathered 
with the specific purpose of constructing comparable rates within the OECD. The purpose is 
to address the measurement errors in the OECD Labour Force Statistic (LFS) database (van 
Stel 2003)10. There are other variables available that have been used as proxies for 
entrepreneurship in recent years, for example exit and entry rates of businesses and nascent 
businesses (in Gentry and Hubbarb 2000 and Baliamoune-Lutz and Geller 2011). Though, the 
main drawback of these measures is the limited availability over time (compared to the self-
employment indicator).11 Nonetheless, as was discussed previously, one should keep in mind 
that the COMPENDIA indicator may either under- or overestimate the full impact of 
entrepreneurship (see section 1.2).  
Lastly, since previous research has shown that females are less likely to become 
self-employed (Hansson 2008), gender disaggregated data on the dependent variable would 
10 The main problem related to the OECD LFS indicator refers to variations across countries on how 
owners/managers of incorporated businesses are counted as self-employed or as employees. The latter case may 
prevail due to the fact that formally, owner/managers of incorporated businesses are employees of their own 
businesses. The Compendia database however addresses these differences by including owners/managers of both 
unincorporated and incorporated businesses in their measure. For countries where this data is lacking, an 
estimation of these numbers is done. Further, in contrast to the OECD LFS data, the Compendia database 
excludes unpaid family members working for the business, as well as people with self-employment as a 
secondary activity. See van Stel (2003) for a more thorough presentation of the database and on the draw backs 
of the original OECD statistics on self-employment. 
11 There have been initiatives to create better measures of entrepreneurship, such as the indicators from Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), however this data does not distinguish between formal and informal 
entrepreneurship, nor does it exclude the agriculture sectors (Nyström 2008). 
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have enabled interesting closer analysis of these findings. Unfortunately the COMPENDIA 
database does not provide this detailed data. Nonetheless, a control variable for the share of 
females in the labour force will be included in order to control for this tendency.  
 
3.1.2 Independent variable: personal income tax and corporate income tax 
As Stenkula (2009) has pointed out, several tax measures are preferred over only one when 
studying the effect of taxes on entrepreneurship.  
The three independent variables that will be used in this study will measure the 
personal income tax and the corporate income tax. The first tax will be measured by two 
indicators: top statutory personal income tax (pit) as a measure of the overall marginal tax rate 
and an indicator of the average income tax rate (av_tax) measured as the average tax rate for a 
single person earning an average wage12. Similar or equal measures have been used in for 
example Stenkula (2009) and Parker and Robson (2004).  
There are many considerations when choosing representing measures of the 
personal income tax. The reason behind including two different measures of personal income 
tax is the fact that previous research has found an opposite effect of these tax rates (Robson 
and Wren 1999), a result that could be evaluated by including these measures. Moreover, as 
incentives depend on marginal tax rates, an indicator of this is especially appealing. Even if 
many self-employed do not face all tax top rates, they still may be appropriate. In fact, Lee 
and Gordon (2005) argue that it is a suitable measure of incentives for potential entrepreneurs 
but it would rather poorly approximate the incentives faced by the general labour force. Bruce 
and Moshin (2006) further argue that it is a simple way to measure the tax level for the self-
employed, and it may be seen as an acceptable proxy for the maximal tax on the marginal 
investment. Third, it might also act as a policy signal affecting the aggregate level of self-
employment in a country (Stenkula 2009) and fourth, it is one of few available tax rates for all 
years and countries in this sample. As Lee and Gordon (2005) highlight, it should though be 
recognized as a “noisy” measure of the incentives for the whole tax schedule. 
The data on average tax is taken from the OECD Tax database (2014)13. A 
typical source for the top statutory marginal tax rate in the literature is the World Tax 
Database from the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR) at the University of Michigan. 
However, when a closer analysis of this data was made in preparation for this study it was 
noted that only the central government statutory tax rates are included in this measure. Given 
that many tax systems in for example the Scandinavian countries are highly decentralized, this 
may be misleading when comparing different countries14. As no other readily available data 
was found on the combined tax rates for the whole period, data on separate central and sub-
central rates from the OECD Tax database (2014)15 was added to each other manually, in 
order to create data on the top marginal tax rates that are more suitable for cross-country 
analysis. However, to be noted is that even though countries may have the same top marginal 
12 There has been research indicating that married individuals have a higher probability of becoming self-
employed compared to single households (Hansson 2008), which could motivate the use of average tax on 
earnings of a married individual instead. Unfortunately the data on the latter is more limited for the given 
sample. Moreover, using this particular measure enables comparison with previous research since this is the 
measure used in for example Parker and Robson (2004). 
13 Available on request from the OECD. 
14 For example, according to the OTPR database, the top statutory income tax in Sweden in 1991 was 20 percent, 
while it in fact was just above 50 percent taking into account the sub-central tax. Moreover, the sub-central tax 
seems to be included in the data for Sweden before 1991 which imply inconsistent methodology in the time 
series. Same inconsistency is found in the data on Denmark. Further examples of decentralized tax systems is 
found and applied to the rates in Canada and Japan. 
15 Currently, this dataset is also available on request from the OECD.  
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rate, the thresholds for this top rate may be at different levels. This implies that it may vary 
considerably how many people actually are subject to the top marginal tax rate. Moreover, as 
surtaxes and tax credits are not considered in the measure, it is still a “noisy” measure, but 
possibly less “noisy” than the data used in Lee and Gordon (2005).  
Furthermore, the harmonized measure of self-employed used in this study 
entails both unincorporated and incorporated business-owners. Given that the profit of the 
latter group of self-employed is likely to be taxed under corporate income tax, inclusion of the 
corporate income tax (cit) is motivated. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the corporate tax 
has been argued to possibly affect the decision on incorporation. This choice is of discrete 
nature; hence the average effective rate is an appropriate measure. According to de Mooij and 
Nicodeme (2007), the statutory corporate income tax is an appropriate approximation of this 
measure. This data was taken from the World Tax Database from the Office of Tax Policy 
Research (OTPR). 
 
3.1.3 Institutional quality and other control variables 
 Given that Nyström (2008) found empirical evidence of the significance impact of business, 
labour and credit regulation (reg) on self-employment as well as legal structure and security 
of property rights (leg) but did not investigate the impact of taxes in combination with these 
institutional variables, these will be included as control variables in this study. The variables 
are collected from the Fraser Institute on Economic Freedom in the World (2014) and are 
qualitative measures on a 0 to 10 point scale. The assessment is performed by the Frasier 
institute based on several aspects per indicator, where a high value is positive and implies 
well regulated markets and protection of property rights. Between 2000 and 2008 the 
indicators are available on annual basis while between 1980 and 2000 it is available on a five 
year basis. Following Nyström (20008) the data will be interpolated during this period in 
order to match our annual data on self-employment16.  
In line with above theoretical framework and following the empirical model of 
Torrini (2002), the indicator of corruption perceptions (corrp) will operationalize overall 
institutional quality in the economies, and will be used in order to calculate dummies for 
higher or lower than average perceived levels of corruption. In studies of self-employment, 
Robson and Wren (1999) argue that it is desirable to include variables that control for both the 
ease and the severity of the punishments when tax avoidance is detected. In their study such 
indicators were not available. Even though corruption perception is not a distinct measure of 
present punishments, it might be seen as an indicator of the ease or presence of non-tax 
compliance in a country. The indicator will be taken from the new data set CANA gathered 
from different sources and constructed by Fulvio Castellacci and Jose Miguel Natera (2011). 
This is a large dataset without missing values for 34 indicators for 134 countries between 
1980 and 2008, including a measure of corruption perceptions.  
Since a large welfare state have been argued to negatively affect 
entrepreneurship, an indicator government size (gov_size), also collected from the Fraser 
Institute, will be added as a control variable. This is also a qualitative measure based on 
several aspects, such as government expenditures and number of public companies. 
All the below variables, controlling for economic and demographic factors, is 
taken from the COMPENDIA database by EIM Business and Policy Research (2013).  
Based on the theoretical discussion on alternative costs of self-employment an 
indicator of gross replacement rate (grr) will be included. Another alternative cost that has 
16 This is of course not without risks and warrant cautious interpretation. This is why the results and their 
robustness will be briefly tested and commented on in section 4.2.3 in chapter four with the results. 
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been used in the literature is average wage, unfortunately this indicator was not available for 
the given sample.  
As previously mentioned, one of the most important factors affecting 
entrepreneurship found in previous research, is the access to finance. Nonetheless, due to 
limited available data for longer time periods this aspect is often approximated by other 
indicators. As in Baliamoune-Lutz and Geller (2011) an indicator on domestic credit by 
banking sector as a share of GDP (bank_credit) will be included, in order to measure financial 
development and capturing the aspects of access to finance. It measures the domestic credit to 
various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government. 
Another indicator of access to finance could be the level of household savings, as is included 
in Fölster (2002), unfortunately it was not available for the given period nor was an indicator 
of the start-up costs used in Baliamoune-Lutz and Geller (2011). Therefore, another variable 
that may partly approximate available finance is the level of GDP. As in previous research 
(Torrini 2002, Fölster 2002, Parker and Robson 2004, Nyström 2008), levels in GDP per 
capita (lag_gdp) and unemployment (unemp) will be included to control for economic 
development, demand and business cyclical fluctuations. Purchasing power parity as of 2000 
is used to make the GDP measure comparable across countries. Theoretically, the sign of 
GDP per capita could be expected to be either positive or negative as was discussed 
previously. Given the previous described theoretical link between entrepreneurs and growth, 
including GDP growth would clearly introduce endogeneity bias to the model. However, 
Fölster (2002) argue that GDP per capita might be endogenous too and due to this, the 
variable will be lagged by one year in order to reduce the potential simultaneity problem. This 
reduces the sample by one year.  
As has already been mentioned, an indicator of female labour as a share of total 
labour force (femp) will also be included. Industry composition is debated as a determinant, 
but self-employment in service sectors are likely to be larger, hence an indicator of share of 
services in total employment (serv_emp) will be included. To control for demographic 
changes during the period, dependency ratio (dep_ratio) is included as in Fölster (2002). 
   
3.1.4 Time and country dimension  
The above mentioned variables constitute a balanced panel data set consisting of yearly 
observations for 17 OECD countries over the years 1982-2008. The delimitations of the time 
period were chosen from an availability perspective. The data on corruption perception only 
stretches as far as 2008 and limitations in the available tax data set determined 1981 as the 
first year of observation, while lagging GDP per capita reduces the sample by one more year. 
Countries were gradually dropped as more variables were added to the data set. The time 
period naturally excludes new OECD members such as the Eastern European countries, but 
the final set of countries is however believed to give fairly well representation of the OECD 
countries as a whole.  
Table 1. Sample of OECD countries  
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany  
Greece 
Italy  
Japan 
New Zeeland  
Portugal  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland 
The Netherlands  
United Kingdom  
USA  
 
 
 17 countries in total 
3.2 Empirical strategy and model specification 
A multiple linear regression will estimate the effect of taxes on the rate of self-employed, 
using the above described variables. Proportions and percentages are kept unlogged but 
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currency units such as GDP per capita are logged (as is usually done for the sake of normality 
and in line with for example Stenkula (2009) and Fölster (2002)). 
Causal inference is dependent on how unobserved factors are taken into account 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 221). Panel data or time series cross sectional data (TSCS)17 
have the advantage of allowing the researcher to control for individual heterogeneity, i.e. that 
unobserved individual-specific effects may be taken into account for. These unobservable 
individual-specific effects, which in this case are country-specific effects, may be assumed to 
be either random or fixed and the choice between specifications depends on the nature of the 
data. If observations are randomly drawn from a large population, a random effects model is 
most suitable, but if observations correspond to a specific country where the inferences are 
conditional on the observed units, a fixed effects model is more appropriate (Veerbeck 2001, 
p. 385, Beck 2001). Naturally, the fixed effects model can be expected to be the appropriate 
choice in this study with TSCS data.  
Formally the fixed effects model is specified as a regression model in deviations 
from individual means, where the transformation is called the within transformation. In the 
first stage, the mean of each variable, noted by a “~” in equation 4 below, is withdrawn. This 
produces equation 5 where the country specific effect, αi, is dropped as we assume the effects 
are constant over time, hence 𝛼𝑖 =  𝑎� i. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   − 𝑦𝚤�  = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 – 𝑥�𝑖) ′𝛽 +  (𝛼𝑖  −  𝛼�𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡  −  𝑢�𝑖)  (4) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   − 𝑦𝚤�  = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 – 𝑥�𝑖) ′𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡  −  𝑢�𝑖)    (5) 
 
The yit equals the rate of self-employment, xit is a vector of different explanatory variables 
(including the tax variables), i and t are cross country and time-dimensions and uit is the error 
term and αi represents the unobserved country factors. Exactly the same estimator for β that is 
obtained by the within transformation is possible to obtain by including dummies for each 
country, represented by d in equation 6 (Verbeek 2009, p. 377). This generates the least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator and will be the model employed in the empirical 
investigation of this thesis: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   =  𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑁𝑗=1 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,   (6) 
 
where dij = 1 if i=j and = 0 otherwise. The baseline model will be the LSDV model with 
country dummies (one-way fixed effects model) but since the time dimension is fairly large a 
two-way fixed effect model, i.e. a model that controls for both unobservable country specific 
effects and time-specific (common trend) effects, will also be explored, in order to fully 
control for possible omitted variables and homogenous shocks (captured by the time 
dummies). By doing this, the model will eliminate all endogeneity problems related to 
unobserved country and time specific factors, given that the error term is identically 
independently distributed (IID) (ibid, p. 376). 
 Lastly, the asymptotics of the TSCS data set is crucial to consider when dealing 
with various diagnostic tests. Potential heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and 
contemporaneous correlation will bias the results of the within estimator (Podesta 2003). 
Several panel adjusted measures rely on asymptotics of fixed T and N ∞, which is not the 
17 So far the data has been defined as panel data, due to the combined dimensions of cross-section and time 
series. However, it might be more correctly to define it as time serie- cross sectional (TSCS) data or panel time 
series as the asymptotics for TSCS data are in T, while opposite is valid for traditional panel data, where N is 
typically large and T is typically short or moderate (Beck 2001).  
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case with our data. Beck (2001) who has focused specifically on appropriate methods for 
TSCS data, proposes that panel corrected standard errors (pcse) should be used in order to 
deal with heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Since the data suffer from both 
problems, pcse will be employed. The data also suffers from first-order serial correlation and 
two alternative remedies are typically available: treat the potential serial correlation by using a 
first order autocorrelation, structure, AR (1), or incorporate over time persistence in the model 
specification and include a lagged dependent variable (Beck 2001). Both methods will be 
investigated, but the former will be the default in all regressions. Lastly, normality is assumed 
based on the large number of observations. 
 3.2.1 Exploring the model 
In order to investigate the effects of taxes on self-employment it may be informative to allow 
for different forms of these effects, which will be done by the below extensions of the 
baseline model. 
 
Lagged and non-linear effects 
In the literature, lagged tax effects have been indirectly investigated in different dynamic 
models (for example, one year lagged effects are de facto estimated in the error correction 
model employed by Robson and Wren (1999) and in the generalized method of moment 
model used in Baliamoune-Lutz and Geller (2011)). Moreover, since Stenkula (2009) argues 
that self-employed adjust relatively slow to changes in the economic environment, 
investigation of lagged tax effects is motivated to shed light on a potential delayed relation. 
Given the possible slow adjustment, a lagged effect on up to three years will be investigated. 
Using lagged tax variables may also be seen as a remedy to avoid issues of simultaneity, as 
was discussed in relation to the lagged indicator on GDP per capita (the other explanatory 
variables are however assumed to be exogenous). 18 
In addition, as an advantage of the many observations of panel data, non-linear 
effects may be allowed for, by including squared terms of the tax rates. It may be important to 
control for, due to the possibly opposing effects (of labour effort and tax avoidance) of the tax 
variable that was described in chapter 2. 
 
Tax-effects conditionally on institutional quality 
In order to explore the second research question of this thesis, namely, does the effect of the 
taxes vary with the quality of institutions; additional interaction terms will be included. First 
and following Torrini (2002), a dummy is created for countries with higher or lower 
corruption than average (compared between the countries included in this sample).  The 
dummy will be noted cpi (corruption perception index) and takes on the value of one when 
the corruption perception is higher than average. In a fixed effects model, the effect of a 
18 For the within-estimator to be consistent, the explanatory variables are required to be strictly exogenous 
(Verbeek 2009, p. 376-8).  Given that panel data reduces the effects of omitted variable bias by the LSDV 
model, reverse causality may instead be the cause to problems of endogeneity. The tax variables can introduce 
simultaneity problems to the model as taxes may not only affect self-employment but self-employment may 
affect taxes. This is usually a problem in micro dataset where individuals are followed over time (where the taxes 
is a endogenous outcome  of the occupational choice) but it also has been argued as a potential problem on 
aggregated level.  The rational is that policymakers may change the taxes as a respond to shocks in levels of 
entrepreneurship or that a large and potential influential group of self-employed may lobby for change in certain 
forms of taxes (Baliamoune-Lutz and Geller 2012, Hansson 2011, Robsson and Wren 1999). As a robustness 
check for the estimates and to mitigate potential simultaneity, lagged tax variables will therefore be included. 
This is based on the argument that past levels of taxes may affect current self-employment rates, but changes to 
current self-employment rates is likely not to affect past tax rates. 
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constant dummy, would be washed out if included individually19, however, as an interaction 
term it may be included. Interaction terms with all three different tax variables will be 
investigated, in order to evaluate the effect of taxes on self-employment where corruption is 
relatively higher. 
Dynamic model 
Including a lagged dependent variable, as was briefly mentioned before, is a possible 
statistical solution to issues of serial correlation. A dynamic model should nevertheless be 
based on theoretical arguments. First, it may be motivated by the statistical characteristics of 
the data, i.e. the large degrees of persistence in the self-employment rates (recall figure 1 in 
chapter 1) Furthermore, given that Torrini (2002) suggests that tax morale of the self-
employed may be conditional on the institutional set up (in his case: the presence of 
corruption) one might argue that self-employment is partial endogenously determined in the 
sense that attitudes around potential entrepreneurs affect the decision to become one. Thus, 
given the persistence and possible habit formation, including a lagged dependent variable 
seems plausible20.  However, within a dynamic framework, the within estimator is usually 
claimed to be both biased and inconsistent when including a lagged dependent variable, as it 
is correlated with the error term21 and hence violates the required assumption of strict 
exogeneity. However this severe (downward) bias of the lagged dependent variable, known as 
Nickel bias or Hurwicz bias, is especially crucial in case of traditional panel data asymptotics 
with large N and small T (<10). The bias disappears when T ∞ and is hence a small sample 
bias that may be acceptable for larger TSCS data (around T>20) (Verbeek 2009, p. 396-7, 
Beck 2011). Nonetheless, we should be aware of the small bias that does remain. 
 
Robust test – stationarity 
The time length of the data employed in this study is of a rather moderate size compared to 
the longer time series data that have been used to study self-employment using cointegration 
techniques22. For example, Nyström (2008) studied a similar period but did not consider the 
issue of non-stationarity. Furthermore, Beck and Katz (2011) argue that with political 
economy data the data may be very persistent, but still stationary on a longer term on which 
data is not available for and this could naturally be the case here. They also stress the 
importance of not solely accepting statistical results in the search for unit roots, but to ask 
whether the characterization of the data having a unit root is plausible. They highlight, as an 
example, that if series have a unit root, they would tend to wander away from their means, 
however, as political economy data often is measured as proportions, the data (its variance) is 
bounded by definition. This is the case in most of the data employed in this study including 
the dependent variable and the tax variables in focus23. 
19 This is because the mean of a constant value is the constant value it self. Recall that the fixed effects model 
imply that the mean of a variable is subtracted from its every observation (see equation 3), a constant variable 
would thus be dropped from the regression. 
20 A third argument would be that of Fölster (2002) who includes a lagged dependent variable based on lingering 
effects on inflow of self-employment due to lower taxes one period, which then result in higher rates the 
following years. 
21  This could be seen in a simple example. Note that a first differencing specification, instead of the 
transformations in equation 4 or 6, yield the same estimate if T=2 (the country specific effects,𝛼𝑖, are 
“differenced out” in below equation). Given this, it is easy to see that a lagged dependent variable, 𝑦𝑡−1 included 
in a differenced model will be correlated with the error term, since both will be a function of  the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009,  p. 245): ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∅∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡.  
22 Typical examples are Stenkula (2009) and Bruce and Moshin (2006) who study self-employment during a 50 
years period, in Sweden and US, respectively. 
23 Moreover, if either series were integrated of order one, I(1), the implication is that it would be equally likely to 
see an increase or decrease in either variable regardless of its present value. Hence one may ask if there really is 
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 However, keeping the above in mind, as an additional robustness test one might 
control for potential unit-root processes. Two tests are used for this purpose, where one does 
not indicate problems of non-stationary data in any variable while the other does in some (see 
further description of the tests in section 4.2.5). In order to be strict in the investigation, I 
continue with the diagnostic tests and find that a log-log specification imply that the second 
test indicate more non-stationary data (the result of this test is found in appendix B). Given 
the relatively limited time dimension of this data one must however note that these tests also 
may lack power (i.e. have low probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis which in these 
tests are that all panels have unit roots) (Verbeek 2009, p. 414, Parker 2004).  If this is the 
case, the data may still be stationary and the fixed effects specification is valid. 
 Beck and Katz (2011) discuss how to estimate slow-moving data, in the light of 
somewhat uncertain risks for unit roots, and they suggest the error correction (EC) model24: 
“…whether series are integrated or stationary but slowly moving they may well be modeled 
by EC specification” (ibid, p. 344), which they write as:  
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∑∆𝑥𝑖𝑡′ ø +  𝛾 (𝑦′𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∑𝑥′𝑖𝑡−1 ĸ) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (7) 
 
The parameter γ in front of the parenthesis is the error-correction parameter and if it is 
significantly different from zero there is a long-run relationship between x and y (the model 
suggests that the integrated variables y and x are cointegrated) (Beck and Katz 2011). As this 
is the model that Robson and Wren (1999) use, the choice of this specification enable our 
results to be compared. Their model is an “unpacked” version of above, which Podesta (2003) 
also uses to estimate non-stationary data, 25 and this is the model that will be estimated: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑦 =  ∑∆𝑥𝑖𝑡′ ø + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 ′ 𝛾 +   ∑𝑥𝑖𝑡−1′ 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (8) 
 
The parameter for the lagged dependent variable, γ, is expected to be between 0 and -1 in 
order to satisfy equilibrium properties of the model, where shocks are reduced over time, 
causing self-employment to converge to a long-run equilibrium. The parameter for the 
differenced (change) variable, ø, capture the short-run (passing) effect while lasting effects is 
captured by the parameter, 𝛽, in front of the lagged independent variables (Podesta 2003). 
Therefore, as a robust test, I conclude the next chapter of results by being strict in the 
interpretation of non-stationarity and use this model, however still cautiously, given the 
limited sample size and the theoretical risks of incorrectly characterizing the data as non-
stationary.  
 
no tendency for variables in focus to be more likely to rise when they are low and fall when high (Beck and Katz 
2011). 
24 Whether or not the persistence is due to high serial correlation or a true sign of unit roots, a first difference 
model would also be plausible. First, because first differencing usually is an effective remedy to serial 
correlation and second, because all variables in this sample are found to be stationary in first-differences 
(implying that they are integrated of order one). However, unlike the EC model this model only captures short-
run effects and not maturation effects (Podesta 2003). 
25 Podesta (2003) highlights that this EC model allows for an asymmetric relationship to be modelled, unlike 
classical cointegration methods that implies a symmetric relation. In this case, a symmetric relation would mean 
that self-employment adjust to changes in tax rates and institutions in the long run (if they are cointegrated), but 
the opposite also holds and the latter might be theoretically questionable. The asymmetric assumption implies 
that self-employment adjusts to a long-run equilibrium but not any of the independent variables. As noted by 
Verbeek (2009, p. 347-8) this requires the assumption of strictly exogenous x, which is materialized in the 
formula of Podestra (and Robson and Wren 1999) by the inclusion of ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡′  witch hence is assumed not to affect 
the error-correction term.  
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Chapter four 
Results  
This chapter presents the results of the study. First, the baseline regression will be analyzed 
followed by some extensions of the initial regression. Except for the output of the baseline 
regression, only the results for the tax variables will be shown in this chapter. All other output 
will be found in Appendix B. As described earlier, all regressions, if not stated otherwise, is 
estimated using panel corrected standard errors and corrected for a common AR (1) process 
across all panels. Correlations between the explanatory variables were analyzed initially and 
due to high correlation (0.8) between GDP per capita and share of employment in the service 
sector, the latter were dropped from the sequent specifications (see correlation matrix, table 
A.3 Appendix A).  
4.1 Baseline regressions 
Table 2 shows the regression output for the one-way (column 1) and the two-way (column 2) 
fixed effect (LSDV) model for the sample with 17 countries between 1982 and 2008.26 The 
fixed effects, i.e. the country and annual time dummies, will not be reported in any table for 
the sake of brevity but will occasionally be commented on in the following results. 
  In the one-way fixed effects model, five out of thirteen variables are significant 
on either a 1, 5 or 10 percent level. One of these has a somewhat unexpected sign. The degree 
of female participation in the labour market, femp, seems to have a positive impact on self-
employment, opposite to the theoretical predictions. One possible explanation to this could be 
that the measure captures something else in the economy with a positive impact, which is 
confirmed by the fact that when controlling for time effects (column 2), the magnitude of the 
parameter decreases and the significance is lost. Also opposite to the theoretical predictions, 
bank_credit seems to have a negative effect of self-employment. However as in Baliamoune-
Lutz (2011) it is not significant. Unemployment, unemp, is significant in all two specifications 
and indicate a negative effect on self-employment, implying that necessity entrepreneurship is 
not dominating the measure of self-employment, instead the “insurance” effect seem to be 
supported by the data (entrepreneurship is not mainly a “last option”, instead, if there are 
salary jobs available (low unemployment) for the potential entrepreneur this may be perceived 
as an  “insurance” and decreases the risk associated with an entrepreneurial venture). As an 
indicator controlling for business fluctuations it suggests that people tend to become self-
employed during better economic times. However, the effect is rather moderate: a 10 
percentage point decrease in unemployment is predicted to increase self-employment roughly 
by 0, 6 percentage points27.  The institutional variables are also significant and also have the 
largest positive impact on self-employment in both specifications, except for the measure on 
legal structures and security of property rights leg that is insignificant with time effects. This 
seems to support theoretical predictions that especially business regulation as well the size of 
the public sector do seem to have an important impact on the incentive structure of self-
employed. Recall the (bounded) scalar for these measures: the higher values of reg, the better 
conditions regarding business and labour regulation prevails in the country (according to the  
26 Note that all values within parenthesis in the tables are p-values. 
27 Evaluated at the sample mean of self-employment of around 11 percent, it roughly represents an increase of 5, 
5 percent. 
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subjective assessment by the Frasier Institute). Higher values of the measure of gov_size 
imply a smaller public sector (there may be relatively few public companies, as an example). 
The significant effect of the latter measure supports the hypothesis by Davidsson and 
Henrekson (2002) that a large public sector may crowd out entrepreneurial activity. 
Concerning the insignificant variable of legal protection and protection of property rights, it 
might be a consequence of the sample consisting of developed countries; hence, the variation 
in this variable may not be large enough to capture any influential effects. It is likely that this 
variable would show larger signs of significance in a larger and more economically diverse 
sample. When the time dummies are included, gross replacement rate grr also gains 
significance and show a small but expected negative effect. Lagged GDP per capita lag_gdp 
is not significant and this is in fact consistent with several other studies that did not find any 
robust significant relationship between self-employment and income levels (Nyström 2008, 
Stenkula 2009, Robson and Wren 1999) however opposite to Parker and Robson (2004) and 
Fölster (2002).  
 Lastly, the parameters of the tax variables are small, and as in previous 
literature, indicate both positive and negative effects, however and most importantly, none of 
the tax variables are significant in this baseline specification. As noted in chapter 2, previous 
Table 2. Baseline regressions, with country (1) and annual time fixed effects (2). 
Variable (1) (2) 
LAG_GDP 0.370 -0.404 
 (0.497) (0.673) 
UNEMP -0.036* -0.058*** 
 (0.059) (0.005) 
FEMP 0.106*** 0.049 
 (0.000) (0.120) 
DEP_RATIO -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.687) (0.807) 
GRR -0.009 -0.015* 
 (0.254) (0.051) 
BANK_CREDIT -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.171) (0.128) 
AV_TAX -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.631) (0.853) 
CIT -0.006 -0.004) 
 (0.159) (0.416) 
PIT -0.002 0.002) 
 (0.736) (0.703) 
REG 0.169** 0.385*** 
 (0.022) (0.000) 
LEG 0.231*** 0.083 
 (0.001) (0.286 ) 
GOVSIZE 0.150** 0.202*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) 
R-squared 0.919 0.927 
Obs 458 458 
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research has found both positive and negative effects from tax on entrepreneurship. However, 
insignificant effects have also been found by Gentry and Hubbarb (2004) and Baliamoune-
Lutz and Geller (2011), using measures of marginal and average taxes on UK and OECD data 
respectively. A careful interpretation of these insignificant results may however be that the 
channels of impact are not correctly captured by this specification. Using this novel 
harmonized measure of cross-country rates on self-employment, the next section will 
therefore be devoted to further investigation of this relationship (as specified in section 3.2.1). 
It should be noted though, that the introduction of country dummies increases 
the variance inflation factor in the model substantially. When analyzing the explanatory 
variables and different specifications, it seems that some of the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the country dummies (as the colinearity is not affected if one or several 
explanatory variables are dropped and is less driven by the time effects). If these country 
effects are excluded, keeping only the time effects, all variables but the tax variables and 
regulation are significant.  However, this is neither surprising nor desirable as the advantage 
of panel data is the possibility to control for heterogeneous effects by the country fixed 
effects, in order to get unbiased estimates. The problem is not unusual; in fact, it is likely to be 
a problem when including country fixed effects in a model where the variables change slowly 
over time (Podesta 2003)28. In short multicollinearity implies reduced efficiency where true 
significant parameters might be rejected, while excluding dummies, as a remedy, might imply 
biased estimates. The main interest in this thesis is the tax variables and fortunately two of 
three tax variables indicate no problem of colinearity. Average tax does however indicate 
problems (VIF tolerance above 0.1), though, it is not a surprise that it is collinear with the 
country fixed effects as there are limited variance in the measure (recall the mean trend in 
figure 4, chapter 2). This might explain possible insignificant results of the variable in the 
subsequent results. Concerning the control variables, lag_gdp, femp and leg are some of the 
most affected and might explain their insignificant signs. As dropping variables or getting 
more data does not solve the problem or is available as an option, I therefore opt to proceed 
with the given specification, especially since unbiased estimates of the tax variables is 
prioritized to the option of significant control variables. To conclude, it should be noted 
though that all regressions presented in this chapter have a mean VIF below the tolerance 
level which somewhat strengthen the overall validity. 
Lastly, computation of goodness-of-fit measures for panel data is “somewhat 
uncommon” (Verbeek 2009, p. 386), since usual R-squared and adjusted R-squared criteria 
are appropriate only if estimated by OLS. In this case the OLS is used to estimate the LSDV 
estimator; however, given the large amount of dummies in combination with the slow-moving 
data structure, the R-squared values are very high and somewhat misleading, 29 which is 
common in the context of panel data. In this case, the reported R-squared may cautiously be 
used to compare different specifications to each other but not to evaluate the estimation.30  
28 Statistically, colinearity problem implies that the X’X matrix is not invertible, leading to high standard errors 
and individual effects being hard to distinguish; i.e. colinearity reduces the efficiency of the estimates and 
increases the risk for type II errors. However, if the colinearity problem is affecting variables that we are not 
mainly interested in (control variables) this problem does not affect the standard errors of the variables we are 
interested in. Hence, the colinearity of the former may be “almost arbitrarily high” (Verbeek 2009, p 43-45). 
Nonetheless, there is a potential trade-off between including country effects or not: between a parsimonious 
model (as a multicollinearity remedy) and a fixed effect specification (as a remedy for endogeneity caused by 
omitted variables) (Podestra 2003). 
29 This is because the R-squared takes into account the variation explained by the fixed effects, i.e. the country 
dummies, and these effects in great extent perfectly fits the variation. This is somewhat misleading as they do 
not explain the variation; rather they cover up the model from omitted variables (Podesta 2003). 
30 Had the estimation been made by the within transformation, an alternative statistic to use would be the within 
R-squared (Veerbek 2009, p. 384-6). In the preferred estimation of the LSDV model with panel corrected 
standard errors, this statistic is however not reported in the statistical package, neither is the adjusted R-squared. 
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Table 3. Lagged effects of taxes with country and time fixed effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
AV_TAX  L1. -0.002   
 (0.891)   
L2.  -0.004  
  (0.810)  
L3.   0.025 
   (0.101) 
CIT  L1. -0.000   
 (0.950)   
L2.  -0.003  
  (0.464)  
L3.   -0.009** 
   (0.040) 
PIT  L1. 0.003   
 (0.611)   
L2.  -0.004  
  (0.463)  
L3.   0.002 
   (0.775) 
R-squared 0.932 0.939 0.942 
Obs 441 424 407 
4.2 Results of exploring the model  
In this section the baseline regression is explored in accordance with the empirical strategy 
that was previously described. As previously mentioned, only the tax variables will be 
presented, where the full output will be found in Appendix B. 
4.2.1 Including lagged effects 
Stenkula (2009) highlights the plausible slow adjustment of self-employment to surrounding 
economic conditions which warrant further study of potential lagged effects of taxes on self-
employment. Seen in table 3 below, using the two-way fixed effects model (i.e. with country 
and annual time dummies), lagged effect of cit is indeed significant in the third lag (column 
3). Notably is also that the av_tax is just almost significant on a 10 percent significance level 
in the third lag (column 3). The cit seem to be negative in all lags, while av_tax have a 
positive effect only in the almost significant third lag. As described earlier, including lags 
may be a remedy strategy to avoid simultaneity problems between our variables of interests, 
and these results suggest that there indeed is some one-way effect of taxes on self-
employment. Cautiously looking at the R-squared values also indicate that the model with 
three lags improves the fitting. This positive effect of the average tax is in line with the 
theoretical and empirical findings in cross-country studies by Parker and Robson (2004) and 
Robson and Wren (1999), where the latter argue that an increase in average tax, holding the 
marginal tax rate constant, makes self-employment a relatively more attractive employment 
However, using the formula for adjusted R-squared, 𝑅�2 = 1 − (1 − 𝑅2)(n − 1)/(n − k − 1) (Wooldridge 
2012), and cross-checking some values by hand yield approximate the same values as the R-squared, only 
slightly smaller, therefore these will not be reported.  
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mode compared with paid employment. However, these scholars found statistically significant 
and also larger effects than these results show31. As Robson and Wren (1999) studied a 
shorter period (14 years) one reason might be that this large effect is bounded to their sample 
period. However, Parker and Robson got a somewhat similar magnitude of their effects and 
they studied a period between 1972 and 1996. One thing they do have in common is the use of 
the non-harmonized dataset from OECD LFS where incorporated business is not consequently 
included in all countries. As they are included in the measure in this study it might point to the 
fact that the unharmonized measure exaggerates the positive effect of average taxes. 
Nonetheless, lagged and hence delayed effects in one and almost two of the tax rates are 
supported by this data. One may also note that the magnitude of the effect also increases with 
lags, which also supports the delayed relation where the decision of starting or closing a 
business is not an immediate decision of changes in taxes.   
Concerning the control variables, those who were significant in the previous 
two-way model (column 2, table 2) seem to be robust, while the effects seem to be slightly 
larger in this model.  
 
4.2.2 Allowing for non-linear effects 
When including squared terms in the two-way fixed effects model in table 4, both corporate 
and personal income tax turns significant in levels and as squared terms (seen in column 2 and 
3, respectively) and in a combined specification (column 4). However, the effects of the 
squared terms are almost negligible. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the inclusion of these  
terms is that corporate tax up to a certain level seems to have a positive impact on self-
employment while above this level it turns negative. The opposite relation is found for 
personal income tax. Again, average tax is not significant. The result suggests that while a 
linear effect on self-employment is not supported by the data in the baseline regression, a non-
linear effect seems to be confirmed. Even though Robson and Wren (1999) received higher 
effects of their marginal tax measure, the negative effect of pit is in line (even slightly larger) 
than the effects found by Bruce and Moshin (2006) and Stenkula (2009) in US and Swedish 
data, respectively. This result suggests that a 10 percentage point decrease in pit would imply 
roughly a 0, 4 percentage point increase in self-employment. Evaluated at the sample mean of 
the self-employment rate of around 11 percent of the total labour force, this would increase 
self-employment by 3 percent. Given that top statutory income tax vary more between 
countries compared with the corporate income tax (there are several countries where the 
difference in marginal taxes is 10 percent or more), this explains the different self-
employment rates to a greater extent32. In contrast to Robson and Wren (1999), Stenkula 
(2009) and Bruce and Moshin (2006) used the same measure of marginal taxes as is used in 
this study, which might also explain the different magnitudes in effect of taxes on self-
employment.  
 The “U”-shaped effect of taxes on self-employment is explained by the possible 
counteracting effects of labour effort and tax avoidance (Garret and Wall 2006). Given this, 
the signs of pit might indicate that the negative labour supply effect dominates, but at higher 
rates this negative effect seem to be somewhat offset, possibly by increased behavior of tax 
avoidance at higher tax rates, according to this theory. Or in terms of the theory of Cullen and  
Gordon (2007) and Djankov et al (2010), at lower rates the negative effects of risk subsidies 
and income shifting is dominating, while being slightly offset at higher rates by the positive  
31 Robson and Wren (1999) found that self-employment would increase by 0.8 percentage points when average 
tax increased by one unit, compared with this value of almost 0,03 percentage points.  
32 In fact, Fölster (2002, p. 138) receive somewhat similar estimates which he consider is “quite a lot”.  
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effect of risk-sharing with the government. However, the opposite relation is shown by the cit, 
indicating that tax avoidance (or risk-sharing) would be the dominating effect at first. As cit is 
levied on mainly the incorporated businesses, it might indicate a somewhat different behavior 
between incorporated and unincorporated businesses, but the “U”-shaped effect gets 
somewhat support from this data. Compared with the previously lagged and negative effect 
one might speculate if the immediate effect of a tax raise in corporate income tax spurs tax 
avoidance whereas the negative labour supply effect dominates later on. 
Concerning the control variables, the signs and effects of unemp, femp, grr and 
the two institutional variables are robust to the earlier specifications (see table B2 in 
Appendix B).  
 
4.2.3 Exploring tax effects conditionally on institutional quality 
Given that the convex relationship between self-employment and taxes seem to get some 
support by this data on harmonized data on self-employment, it seems valid to pursue with the 
investigation of the second research question: does institutional quality have an impact on the 
effect of taxes on the self-employed? So far, the results seem to support the idea of the 
importance (and positive effect) of the quality on regulation on self-employment. What about 
when institutional quality overall may be relatively low in the economy due to for example 
corruption?  
Following Torrini (2002), a dummy was created based on average perceptions 
on corruption in each country for the whole period. The countries that through out the sample 
period had higher rates than average were coded “1” and the countries with lower than 
average corruption perceptions were coded as “0”. Of 17 countries 7 countries had higher than 
average corruption in this sample. In table 5, the results are found where interaction terms 
between the dummy and the respective tax measure have been included to the two-way fixed 
effects model. 
 Again, the previous significant control variables are robust in signs and 
magnitude while av_tax is still not significant, nor pit. However, turning to cit, both terms are 
significant and both have their expected signs (seen in column 3 and 4). These results indicate  
Table 4. Quadratic model with country and time fixed effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AV_TAX -0.018   -0.011 
 0.585   0.730 
AV_TAX  squared 0.000   0.000 
 0.597   0.745 
CIT  0.029*  0.048*** 
  0.066  0.009 
CIT squared  -0.000**  -0.001*** 
  0.043  0.006 
PIT   -0.028* -0.041** 
   0.052 0.010 
PIT squared   0.000** 0.000*** 
   0.045 0.008 
R-squared 0.922 0.926 0.922 0.928 
Obs 458 458 458 458 
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that when corruption is lower than average, cit has a negative effect on self-employment, 
while in the presence of relatively high corruption, the effect is positive. Hence, the findings 
of Torrini (2002), seem to be robust in longer time series data and concerning corporate 
income tax, in fact, the magnitude seems to be slightly larger with this data. Note however, 
that when Da Rin et al (2011) studied the effect of corporate income tax interacted with 
“good” or “bad” tax accounting standards on firm level he does not find a positive effect in 
the latter countries, but rather a smaller negative effect. Hence, on an aggregated level the 
effect of low law enforcement seem to be larger. 
So far some interesting patterns have emerged in this data. The effect of taxes on 
self-employment is not necessarily linear and counteracting effects demand careful modeling 
of the data generating process. It might suggest that there indeed is a negative effect of tax on 
self-employment, but given the institutional environment in a country, the impact may be 
altered. This warrants a contextual analysis before policymakers start tweaking in the 
respective tax schedules, in order to receive the desired results. 
In addition to the interaction terms, the institutional indicator on regulations 
seems to have a robust impact, as well as the government size. However, the results should be 
interpreted carefully as some of the observations have been generated by interpolation were 
there were missing values (as done in Nyström 2009). The robustness of the results was 
however tested by rerunning the above regressions were the missing data instead were 
replaced by the previous known value in each indicator. This created small periods (5 years) 
of constant values in each indicator and hence less variance in the sample. Overall these 
alternative estimations indicated  
almost the same robust results what regards the above significance and signs in the tax 
variables. The same was found with respect to the regulation indicator, however the 
magnitude were slightly smaller, however still large. The indicator on government size was 
also somewhat smaller and did turn up significant in much fewer specifications, however 
where significance were not robust, in most cases the p-value was just above the significance 
level of 10 percent. Hence, given the similar results and for the sake of brevity these results 
are not reported.  
 
Table 5. Interaction terms between taxes and corruption, with country and time fixed effects. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
AV_TAX 0.007   0.023 
 (0.678)   (0.182) 
AVTAX*CPI -0.029   -0.036 
 (0.392)   (0.299) 
PIT  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.402)  (0.727) 
PIT*CPI  0.012  0.008 
  (0.179)  (0.386) 
CIT   -0.012** -0.011** 
   (0.018) (0.03) 
CIT*CPI   0.031*** 0.028*** 
   (0.001) (0.006) 
R-squared 0.922 0.924 0.936 0.933 
Obs 458 458 458 458 
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Table 6. Lagged dependent variable with country and time fixed effects. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SEMP L1. 0.883*** 0.869*** 0.887*** 0.875*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AV_TAXS -0.000  0.008 0.001 
 (0.955)  (0.656) (0.946) 
CIT -0.003  0.025* -0.008** 
 (0.362)  (0.053) (0.022) 
PIT -0.000  0.017** 0.003 
 (0.994)  (0.019) (0.373) 
AV_TAX L3.  -0.003   
  (0.673)   
CIT L3.  -0.005*   
  (0.065)   
PIT L3.  0.006*   
  (0.066)   
AV_TAX squared   -0.000  
   (0.685)  
CIT sqaured   -0.000**  
   (0.036)  
PIT squared   -0.000***  
   (0.006)  
AV_TAX*CPI   -0.001 
    (0.949) 
CIT*CPI    0.014** 
    (0.013) 
PIT*CPI    -0.007 
    (0.197) 
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Obs 441 407 441 441 
4.2.4 Lagged dependent variable 
As was previously discussed, persistence in self-employment rates and the possibility of habit 
formation motivated the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Moreover, Beck (2001) 
suggests that serial correlation should be dealt with by including a lagged dependent variable.   
The results are found in the above table 6. The lagged dependent variable turns 
up strongly significant which is not surprising given the persistence in the data. However, 
most of the other control variables loose their significance except for unemp and reg. Lagged 
GDP per capita also turns significant and has a negative impact on self-employment rate. This 
might suggests that higher income levels imply more capital per worker and hence larger 
firms in general and/or supports the argument of Fölster (2002) that countries with lower 
income levels have less efficient distribution system which creates job opportunities for self-
employed. The variables grr, gov_size and leg are only partly significant in different 
specifications (compare column 2-4, table B.4, Appendix B). This might be a reason for not to 
prefer this specification as with lagged dependent variables it is common that the results are 
too strongly driven by this variable. Therefore it is interesting to note that reg is robust in its 
significant impact and moreover, that all the above results on taxes seem to be somewhat 
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robust in significance. The earlier significant lagged effect of cit is robust in this specification 
as seen in column 2, and pit is also significant and positive in this specification. Notable is 
that both pit and cit in the non-linear specification  (column 3) seem to be dominant by 
possibly tax avoidance behavior at lower rates, while dominant by the negative labour supply 
factor at higher rates, which is opposite to what Georgellis and Wall (2006) found. When 
including a lagged dependent variable in the specification with interaction terms, the expected 
sign and significance of cit is robust. Even though this specification might not be our 
preferred one, it strengthens the hypothesis that cit does have a significant, although small 
effect on self-employment.  
 
4.2.5 Stationarity 
Beside the earlier discussed theoretical reasons and the forthcoming statistical reasons, test for 
non-stationarity may be motivated due to the relatively high significant parameter of the 
lagged dependent variable, in the previous section (seen in the first row of table 6). A 
parameter close to 1 may indicate non-stationarity. However, in light of the previously 
discussed theoretical and statistical reasons (see section 3.2.1) against the possibility of unit 
roots in this sample, the following analysis is pursued cautiously as a diagnostic test of the 
robustness of previously results. 
The Levin-Li-Chu (LLC) test does not indicate unit root in the self-employment 
variable. However, since the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test is said to be a more powerful (Parker 
and Robson 2004) and less restrictive test33, this test is also used and three different functional 
forms are tested. First, including a trend and subtracting cross-sectional averages from the 
series, secondly using only a trend and third including neither of these two factors. Lags are 
included based on the akaike information criteria (AIC). The null hypothesis is that all panels 
have unit roots and the alternative is that a fraction of the panels are stationary (Verbeek 2009, 
p. 413-4). The conclusion is that according to this test, self-employment and all tax variables 
seem to be non-stationary and some of the control variables (see results in table B5 in 
Appendix B).  
Continuing by estimating the error correction model, it may be plausible to omit 
some of the variables as all parameters are entered twice in this model. Given that dep_ratio, 
leg, grr and bank_credit were rarely significant in previous specifications, they were omitted. 
This roughly corresponds, hence enable further comparison, to the specification employed by 
Robson and Wren (1999) (except for regulation and government size which are included 
based on previous significance). 
 Table 7 presents the results from the error-correction model earlier specified in 
section 3.2.1. Following Robson and Wren (1999), the estimation is done on the natural 
logarithm of all but the tax variables. Two-way fixed effects were at first modeled but since 
almost none of the time effects were significant in this specification (most likely due to the 
included first differenced variables that instead capture these annual effects), they were 
omitted in order to reduce the persisting colinearity in the model. This did not change any of 
the variables in a notable way. The drop in the value of R-squared is likely due to the 
dependent variable being measured as changes, rather than in levels. 
33 Assuming that a variable is generated from an autoregressive process, this process can be rewritten to: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜋𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where 𝜋𝑖 =  𝛾𝑖 − 1. The null hypothesis of both these tests corresponds to 𝜋𝑖 = 0 
for all i, whereas the LLC alternative hypothesis assume the same 𝜋 across all countries. The IPS test allow for 
different 𝜋𝑖 and hence a heterogeneous (less restrictive) alternative hypothesis (Verbeek 2009, p. 412-3). 
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In column 1, the results indicate that there is a significant error correction process that adjusts 
self-employment to an equilibrium level, as the lagged parameter in front  
of the dependent variable is significant and between 0 and 1. However, according to this 
result, the adjustment seem to be rather fast where around 90 percent of a one unit shock will 
die out in a year in the rate of self-employment (calculated by taking 1 minus the parameter of 
the lagged dependent variable) (Beck 2011). Moreover there seems to be a lasting, negative 
effect of lag_gdp as well as a significant short-run effect of lag_gdp on self-employment (see 
table B.6 in the appendix). The only other significant lasting effect on self-employment seems 
to be cit (see column 1), an indication of this result being robust through specifications and 
possibly indicating a long run relationship between the variables. Given that this model is a 
log-linear model with respect to the tax rates, the interpretation of the effect is similar, only 
slightly smaller, than previously found: Evaluated at sample mean, a ten percentage point 
decrease in cit, would yield approximate a one percent increase in the self-employment rate. 
The interaction terms of taxes and corruption dummies was also included to the model as 
further test, however, without  
significant result, why for the sake of brevity these results are not reported. This model is 
possible to augment in different ways to fit the data generating process (for example by 
adding other leads or lags of the explanatory variables); there is a possibility that such 
measures would have improved the significance of some variables and the model as a whole, 
but as the control variables are of secondary interest of the study it will not be investigated 
further. 
In the second column an attempt to further compare the results with Robson and 
Wren (1999) is done, by decreasing the sample size to match the one used in their study34. 
The lasting effect of income level vanish, however, notably is that pit now show, similarly as 
in their study,  a significant negative effect on both short and long run, while the effect of cit 
is no longer significant. Instead there is a significant short-term effect. Even though not 
significant (which again might be due to problems with multicolliniearity), it is also notable 
34 They study the period 1978-1992 (with three year gaps), but since the dataset in this thesis start from 1982 the 
period 1982-1992 on annual data is used. 
Table 7. Error correction model 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
SEMP L1. -0.095*** -0.179*** -0.223*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
AV_TAX. L1. -0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.606) (0.202) (0.860) 
CIT L1. -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.005) (0.364) (0.016) 
PIT L1. 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.729) (0.010) (0.992) 
AV_TAX D1. -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.856) (0.564) (0.697) 
CIT D1. -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.191) (0.076) (0.054) 
PIT D1. -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.298) (0.028) (0.253) 
R-squared 0.179 0.336 0.429 
Obs 459 187 187 
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that the tax variable av_tax also changes sign and becomes positive in this reduced sample, as 
is also found in the study by Robson and Wren (1999). What regards the pure effect, this 
reduced sample weakly confirms their findings of opposite effects of average and marginal 
tax, however this result is not robust in a longer setting. This might highlight the importance 
of the period you are studying when trying to determine influential variables on self-
employment. Even though the variables reg and gov_size were not significant in the larger 
sample, they have in previous results been strongly significant, that is why they are included 
in column 3. In the reduced sample they indeed turn significant, similar to previous results, 
once again highlighting how different results may be obtained depending on the time 
dimension. Furthermore, including these imply that cit regain significance, which may 
highlight the need to jointly include institutions and taxes in order to accurately capture the 
effects of taxes on self-employment rates. 
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Chapter five 
Discussion  
The aim of this thesis was twofold: To evaluate how taxes may affect the rate of self-
employment, as a proxy for entrepreneurs, and how these effects may be affected by the 
quality of institutions. The first part was investigated by using a relative novel harmonized 
data set on self-employment that so far has not been used in order to investigate the impact of 
taxes. Moreover, both measures of personal income taxes and corporate income taxes were 
included as independent variables, where the latter on an aggregated level in a cross-country 
setting seems not to have been investigated previously. As research has highlighted the 
importance of well-functioning institutions to foster growth, research on entrepreneurs has 
under the last couple of years taken interest in these aspects of an innovation-promoting 
environment. Against this background, variables capturing aspects of regulation and legal 
structure were included. Moreover, as the effect of taxes on self-employment has been found 
to generate counteracting effects between negative labour supply and tax avoidance, the effect 
of how institutional quality may have an impact of the effect on tax avoidance behavior was 
investigated. As the employed dependent variable is a relatively new measure and likely 
superior to the OECD LFS indicator, previously used, in combination with modeling several 
different channels of tax effects on self-employment, this study fills a gap in the literature. 
To summarize the main results, average tax was never significant in any 
specification. However, the results of top statutory marginal income tax (pit) and top 
corporate income (cit) tax suggested that there is some relation between taxes and self-
employment but the effects are very small. This is line with the results found by Bruce and 
Moshin (2006) among others, but smaller than the results found by Parker and Robson (2004) 
for example. It might mean that when longer time-series are studied, the effect of taxes is 
reduced. It might also indicate that the unharmonized measure from OECD LFS used in the 
latter (as well as in Robson and Wren 1999) does cause biased results. A third explanation to 
the smaller estimates compared to some (but not all) studies could be statistically. It is known 
that fixed effects estimates may suffer from attenuation bias due to enlarged measurement 
error in this model, hence it may account for smaller fixed effects estimates (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009, p. 225). In the case of pit, significance is not robust, but in general a negative 
effect is found, consistent with most previous research (on marginal rates). The effect of cit is 
robust through almost all specifications. Interestingly, is that these results of a small, negative 
effect of cit, but of no other tax rate, correspond to the study by Lee and Gordon (2005) where 
they use similar tax measures but investigate their effects on GDP growth, with the motivation 
that the linkage between taxes and growth could be through entrepreneurs. 
Is there a specific reason to the fact that cit seems to have a more prominent 
effect on this particular self-employment measure? One explanation could be that the main 
improvement of this measure is the consistent inclusion of incorporated businesses, which in 
the unharmonized measure were included differently depending on the country. As pointed 
out by Steel (2003), the number of incorporated businesses have increased faster than 
unincorporated, which implies that this group of self-employed is relatively larger in this 
measure compared to the one employed by Parker and Robson (2004). It does not all in all 
explain the insignificance of pit, but it gives to reason to the significant cit. 
However the expected negative sign of cit seems to be dominant where the 
channel of effect is allowed to be dynamic or lagged, which is one strong indication of the 
need to carefully model the determinants of self-employment (especially given the absence of 
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a general accepted theoretical model of entrepreneurship). This might be the reason for why 
the standard specification for the error-correction model indicated that only two variables 
were significant related to self-employment. Further investigation in the modeling might have 
generated somewhat other results. This might also be the reason for why studies have begun 
to look at the question of taxes and entrepreneurship using more complicated indicators of the 
tax system (Georgellis and Wall 2006).  Nonetheless, as in Stenkula (2009), the effect of the 
significant corporate tax variable in the EC model was similar to the magnitude in the fixed 
effects model. Moreover, the data suggest that opposite effects of taxes on self-employment 
may exist and especially confirms the findings of Torrini (2002) indicating that a positive 
effect of corporate tax might be due to the current institutional context, rather than a general 
feature of self-employed. However, what Torrini (2002) does not discuss (nor Da Rin et al 
(2011)) is the fact that the construction of the dummy to investigate this relation, implies a 
subsample analysis. That is, the dummy takes on value of 1 for all observations of one 
country, if the corruption in general has been higher than the average corruption for the whole 
sample of countries. That is, caution when interpreting this result is crucial, as it in fact means 
that any potential common feature of these countries may cause the positive (or less negative) 
effect of taxes.  
To summarize the effect of the control variables, only a few seemed to be robust 
in signs and magnitude. Unemployment seems to have a negative effect on self-employment 
rates indicating that there is no dominating recession push into self-employment. Instead, a 
well-functioning labour market might function as a risk-reducing effect. In a couple of 
specifications the gross replacement rate indicated signs of an expected negative effect on 
self-employment. This variable acted as an alternative cost to self-employment and further, if 
self-employed do not receive the same benefit entitlements as those in wage employment, 
high replacement rates might increase the perceived risk associated to self-employment. The 
causality is of course not clear cut, high replacement rates might also be an indication of a 
larger public sector, which according to Davidsson and Henrekson (2002) might crowd out 
entrepreneurial activity in several sectors. Given that the measure of government size also 
indicated somewhat robust significance this might be the case. Lastly, the qualitative 
institutional measure of business, labour and credit regulation seemed the most robust of all 
control variables, indicating that this might be perceived as a more crucial impediment by 
potential self-employed, compared with for example tax rates. Complicated business 
regulation may be a larger burden to manage for a small business owner compared to tax rates 
and a possible reason could be that the former is perceived as a less transparent “cost” 
compared with tax rates.  
Since the data suffered partly of multicolliniearity when controlling for fixed 
effects, this might be a potential explanation for the overall insignificance. This is also a 
potential statistical explanation to why the variable on average tax showed robust 
insignificance, as the variance of this variable is less compared to the other two tax rates. 
However, it is interesting to note that no other study have commented on potential 
colliniearity issues between slow-moving variables, such as the average tax rate, and country 
fixed effects, which I find reason to believe must be somewhat present also in other studies. 
Aside theoretical explanations, as well as methodological considerations, the 
results are a result of the data employed. This means that small effects of the tax variables 
may simply be a result of the chosen measures. As the measure in this study corresponds to 
those of Stenkula (2009) and Bruce and Moshin (2006) which uses the same tax measures and 
receive similar results, this is a plausible explanation. The small effect of pit in all these 
studies might suggest that the top marginal tax rate is not applicable to most of these 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, Robson and Wren (1999) used the effective marginal rate of average 
earnings, which is a somewhat different measure. Lastly, the fixed effects model assumes 
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poolability of the data, given that heterogeneous effects are allowed as constants, but the 
slopes (i.e. the β) are assumed to be homogenous in the sample. Including interaction terms as 
in Torrini (2002), indicated that the parameter of a subsample of countries, have a different 
sign. This might suggest that the effect of taxes is not mainly a discussion of the right 
indicators or model, but rather of the possibility to pool different countries with different tax 
system together. 
  
5.1 Conclusions 
As to answer the research questions in this thesis and to summarize the above results and 
discussion, based on the results of data on 17 countries over 26 years, taxes seem to have a 
small, if, any impact on self-employment. The negative sign of corporate tax is however 
robust and the magnitude consistent with other studies that have found small effects. 
Concerning quality of institutions, the hypothesis that presence of corruption may have an 
impact on the sign and effect of taxes on self-employment received some support, i.e. where 
corruption is relatively higher, the positive effect of taxes seem to dominate the negative 
labour supply effect. This warrants careful use of the tax schedule, when the desire is to 
stimulate entrepreneurship. Hence, one of the main conclusions of the results in this study is 
that using the tax system in order to have an impact on the rate of self-employment seems to 
be somewhat inefficient government policy. Enhancing regulation and cutting red-tape might 
be of greater importance. 
Since the research area itself has generated very mixed results, in both controls 
and independent variables, and since the longer time dimension of this data nonetheless 
implied limited available variables, the expectations were not to produce hard evidence. 
Moreover, when evaluating the effect of taxes on self-employment, aggregated studies have 
some drawbacks in comparison to individual micro data studies and it is important to bear in 
mind that aggregated models provide only a general insight into the principal determinants of 
self-employment.  Nonetheless, a general insight with regards to several countries also have 
some value in itself, as micro data usually is concentrated on a single country context.  
Further research using cross-country individual data with the possibility to evaluate different 
measures of taxes would most likely provide interesting contributions to the field.   
Enhanced strategies and considerations regarding the choice of specific data for 
potential future research have already been discussed. In addition to the methodological 
aspects that have been analyzed, more prominent results in the impact of taxes on self-
employment would also warrant a more close attention to possible simultaneity problems in 
future aggregated research. Except for the use of estimation methods such as generalized 
methods of moment (GMM), suitable for shorter dimensions of time, no other instrumental 
technique has been used in macro data research on self-employment as far as I have been able 
to find. One instrument of taxes that could be considered in future research is the instrument 
of taxes proposed by Lee and Gordon (2005), where country tax rates are instrumented by the 
distance weighted neighboring countries tax rates, which have been used in other fields of 
research. 
Due to mixed results of the effect of different taxes on self-employment it is 
likely that this research will continue to grow. The development of different and hopefully 
enhanced measurements of entrepreneurship will probably enlighten the discussion. 
Moreover, the stickiness and persistence in different self-employment numbers within 
countries is something that still seem to be rather unexplained with a lot of potential in theory 
development. As traditional economic policy variables such as taxes and unemployment 
clearly are unable to explain the whole picture, there is probably much research to be done in 
the future with regards to attitudes and cultures, variables that traditionally share the same 
persistent patter as self-employment. 
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Appendix A 
Data and descriptive statics  
 
Table A.1 Variable description35 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AV_TAX 476 17.639 9.232 0.399 44.390 
BANK_CREDIT 475 123.794 54.897 23.181 312.784 
CIT 476 34.880 9.595 8.500 56.000 
CORRP 476 7.611 1.7621 2.99 10 
DEP_RATIO 476 49.571 3.165 43.302 58.255 
GDP 476 23483.26 5395.50 10007 38713.0 
GOV_SIZE 476 4.857 1.319 1.800 8.000 
GRR 476 28.073 13.595 0.300 64.900 
LEG 476 7.997 0.923 5.600 9.600 
PIT 476 53.105 13.126 11.500 93.000 
REG 476 6.850 1.189 3.900 8.900 
SEMP 476 10.931 3.930 5.600 21.000 
UNEMP 476 7.092437 3.356136 0.2 19.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Since employment in the service sector (serv_emp) was omitted due to high multicolinearity in the empirical section of the 
thesis, it is not reported.  
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Table A.2 Variable description36  
Variable Description37 Source38 
AV_TAX Average income tax rate on 100% of average earnings   for a single person.  5 
BANK_CREDIT Domestic credit by banking sector as a share of GDP. 1 
CIT Top statutory corporate tax rate. 4 
CORRP Corruption perception index, scale 0-10.  2 
DEP_RATIO Population aged 0‐15 and >65 as share of total population. 1 
GDP GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita (in year 2000 US dollars). 1 
GOV_SIZE Qualitative measure of government size, scale 0-10. 3 
GRR Gross replacement ratio. 1 
LEG Quality of legal structure and security of property rights, scale 0-10. 3 
PIT Top statutory marginal tax rate on labor income. 539 
REG Quality of business, labor and credit regulation,  scale 0-10. 3 
SEMP Non-agriculture self-employment as share of labor force. 1 
UNEMP Unemployment as share of labor force. 1 
Table A.23 Correlation matrix. sample 1981-200840 
 AVTAX B_CRED CIT D_RAT FEMP G_SIZE GRR LEG GDP PIT REG S_EMP UNEMP 
AVTAX 1.00             
B_CRED -0.36 1.00            
CIT 0.13 -0.32 1.00           
D_RAT -0.06 -0.03 -0.28 1.00          
FEMP 0.49 0.11 -0.24 -0.08 1.00         
G_SIZE -0.28 0.30 0.09 -0.19 0.15 1.00        
GRR 0.39 -0.32 -0.01 -0.01 0.22 -0.11 1.00       
LEG 0.14 0.09 -0.21 -0.05 0.46 0.05 0.37 1.00      
GDP 0.20 0.47 -0.41 -0.13 0.48 0.07 0.09 0.28 1.00     
PIT 0.27 -0.19 0.51 -0.08 -0.23 -0.17 0.14 -0.22 -0.39 1.00    
REG 0.10 0.36 -0.18 0.03 0.62 0.48 0.04 0.51 0.39 -0.28 1.00   
S_EMP 0.36 0.33 -0.32 -0.16 0.65 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.80 -0.33 0.57 1.00  
UNEMP 0.14 -0.41 0.18 -0.11 -0.27 0.03 0.12 -0.13 -0.36 0.10 -0.25 -0.10 1 
36 Since employment in the service sector (serv_emp) was omitted due to high multicolinearity in the empirical section 
of the thesis, it is not reported.  
37 Where qualitative measures are used in a 0 to 10 point scale, high values indicate no corruption/ small government/ 
well protected property rights/ well regulated business, labour and credit markets. 
38 Source: Online Databases 
1 - COMPENDIA: EIM Business and Policy Research (2013) 
2 -CANA: Castellacci, F and Natera, J, M (2011) 
3 -EFW: The Fraser Institute (2014) 
4 -OTPR: Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan 
5- OECD: OECD, Tax database (available on request) 
39 The raw data from OECD consists of top statutory central and sub-central personal income tax rates that have been 
added together by the author, see further explanation in section 3.1.2. 
40 In order to fit the table appropriately, some variables have shorter names in this table. AVTAX = AV_TAX; 
B_CRED=BANK_CREDIT; D_RAT= DEP_RATIO; G_SIZE=GOV_SIZE; S_EMP= SERV_EMP 
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Appendix B 
Regression outputs (Note that all values within parenthesis in the following tables are p-values). 
Table B1. Lagged effects of taxes with country and annual time dummies. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
LAG_GDP -0.254 -0.385 -0.130 
 (0.793) (0.697) (0.894) 
UNEMP -0.059*** -0.078*** -0.076*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
FEMP 0.053 0.033 0.016 
 (0.108) (0.280) (0.611) 
DEP_RATIO -0.012 -0.013 -0.023 
 (0.628) (0.618) (0.391) 
GRR -0.014* -0.016** -0.018** 
 (0.068) (0.046) (0.031) 
BANK_CREDIT -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.162) (0.199) (0.289) 
AV_TAX    
L1. -0.002   
 (0.891)   
L2.  -0.004  
  (0.810)  
L3.   0.025 
   (0.101) 
CIT    
L1. -0.000   
 (0.950)   
L2.  -0.003  
  (0.464)  
L3.   -0.009** 
   (0.040) 
PIT    
L1. 0.003   
 (0.611)   
L2.  -0.004  
  (0.463)  
L3.   0.002 
   (0.775) 
REG 0.421*** 0.436*** 0.474*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEG 0.058 0.056 0.059 
 (0.436) (0.441) (0.432) 
GOVSIZE 0.197** 0.201*** 0.224*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) 
R-squared 0.932 0.939 0.942 
Obs 441 424 407 
41 
 
 Table B.2 Quadratic model with country and annual time dummies. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LAG_GDP -0.378 -0.333 -0.121 -0.002 
 0.694 0.727 0.901 0.999 
UNEMP -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.055*** -0.057*** 
 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.006 
FEMP 0.041 0.047 0.034 0.036 
 0.206 0.131 0.278 0.246 
DEP_RATIO -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 
 0.861 0.777 0.891 0.775 
GRR -0.016** -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* 
 0.047 0.052 0.053 0.061 
BANK_CREDIT -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.143 0.119 0.165 0.139 
REG 0.368*** 0.381*** 0.377*** 0.388*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEG 0.093 0.086 0.075 0.081 
 0.229 0.263 0.330 0.292 
GOVSIZE 0.190** 0.191** 0.183** 0.182** 
 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 
AV_TAX -0.018   -0.011 
 0.585   0.730 
AV_TAX squared 0.000   0.000 
 0.597   0.745 
CIT  0.029*  0.048*** 
  0.066  0.009 
CIT squared  -0.000**  -0.001*** 
  0.043  0.006 
PIT   -0.028* -0.041** 
   0.052 0.010 
PIT squared   0.000** 0.000*** 
   0.045 0.008 
R-squared 0.922 0.926 0.922 0.928  
Obs 458 458 458 458 
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Table B.3. Interaction terms between taxes and corruption, with country and annual time dummies. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LAG_GDP -0.322 -0.171 -0.265 -0.042 
 (0.737) (0, 858) (0.778) (0.965) 
UNEMP -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
 (0,007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
FEMP 0.042 0,041 0,057 0,047 
 (0,191) (0,182) (0.06) (0.124) 
DEP_RATIO -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.879) (0.961) (0.872) (0.838) 
GRR (-0.015* -0.014* -0.013* -0.011 
 (0.054) (0.078) (0.087) (0.171) 
BANK_CREDIT -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.146) (0.138) (0,.144) (0.197) 
REG 0.371*** 0.387*** 0.414*** 0.424*** 
 (0,000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEG 0.096 0.079 0.07 0.078 
 (0.215) (0.306) (0.364) (0.319) 
GOVSIZE 0.189** 0.197** 0.226*** 0.218*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
AV_TAX 0,.007   0.023 
 (0.678)   (0.182) 
AVTAX*CPI -0.029   -0.036 
 (0.392)   (0.299) 
PIT  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.402)  (0.727) 
PIT*CPI  0.012  0.008 
  (0.179)  (0.386) 
CIT   -0.012** -0.011** 
   (0.018) (0.03) 
CIT*CPI   0.031*** 0.028*** 
   (0.001) (0.006) 
R-squared 0.922 0.924 0.936 0.933  
Obs 458 458 458 458 
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Table B.4. Lagged dependent variable with country and time annual dummies. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SEMP L1. 0.883*** 0.869*** 0.887*** 0.875*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAG_GDP -0.819** -0.802* -1.136** -0.739 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.010) (0.108) 
UNEMP -0.025** -0.024** -0.027*** - 0.021** 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.009) (0.047) 
FEMP -0.023 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.112) (0.227) (0.389) (0.252) 
DEP_RATIO -0.010 -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.188) (0.468) (0.104) (0.208) 
GRR -0.004 -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.242) (0.059) (0.343) (0.218) 
BANK_CREDIT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.109) (0.223) (0.104) (0.085) 
REG 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.168*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
LEG 0.052 0.043 0.069* 0.051 
 (0.133) (0.234) (0.072) (0.150) 
GOVSIZE 0.053 0.070* 0.055 0.052 
 (0.154) (0.079) (0.133) (0.164) 
AV_TAXS -0.000  0.008 0.001 
 (0.955)  (0.656) (0.946) 
CIT -0.003  0.025* -0.008** 
 (0.362)  (0.053) (0.022) 
PIT -0.000  0.017** 0.003 
 (0.994)  (0.019) (0.373) 
AV_TAX L3.  -0.003   
  (0.673)   
CIT L3.  -0.005*   
  (0.065)   
PIT L3.  0.006*   
  (0.066)   
AV_TAX squared   -0.000  
   (0.685)  
CIT sqaured   -0.000**  
   (0.036)  
PIT squared   -0.000***  
   (0.006)  
AV_TAX*CPI   -0.001 
    (0.949) 
CIT*CPI    0.014** 
    (0.013) 
PIT*CPI    -0.007 
    (0.197) 
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Obs 441 407 441 441 
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Table B.5 Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test. 
Panel Unit Root Test in levels, with the natural logarithm.W-t-bar statistic. 
Asterix indicates stationarity on 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level. 
Variable Trend and demeaned Trend, not demeaned No trend, nor demeaned 
SEMP -0.5594 0.4642 -0.5058 
GDP -0.2650 -1.2743* 1.2754 
UNEMP -2.0229** -3.3208*** -2.8924*** 
FEMP -1.3518* -1.5419* -5.0241*** 
DEP_RATIO -3.0746*** -4.1275*** -4.5640*** 
GRR -2.9106*** -7.0991*** -3.8876*** 
BANK_CREDIT 1.3453 1.4800 1.9143 
REG -0.6709 -1.6211* 1.3701 
LEG -2.2782** 5.4483 -1.6023* 
GOVSIZE 1.5224 1.5440 -0.1642 
CIT -3.0736* -1.1693 0.6297 
PIT -0.7491 0.1492 0.7744 
AV_TAX 0.8492 -0.8134 -0.2749 
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Table B6. Error correction model 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 SEMP L1. -0.095*** -0.179*** -0.223*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
GDP L1. -0.037* -0.020 -0.028 
 (0.058) (0.686) (0.596) 
UNEMP L1. -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.552) (0.744) (0.676) 
FEMP L1 0.006 0.008 -0.038 
 (0.858) (0.886) (0.480) 
REG L1 0.032  0.139*** 
 (0.132)  (0.001) 
GOVSIZE  L1. 0.016  0.110*** 
 (0.253)  (0.000) 
AV_TAX  L1. -0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.606) (0.202) (0.860) 
CIT  L1. -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.005) (0.364) (0.016) 
PIT  L1. 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.729) (0.010) (0.992) 
GDP D1. 0.215*** 0.267*** 0.193*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) 
UNEMP D1. -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.458) (0.320) (0.612) 
FEMP D1. -0.130 -0.133 -0.190 
 (0.289) (0.382) (0.172) 
REG D1. 0.069  0.192 
 (0.109)  (0.126) 
GOVSIZE D1. 0.027  0.270*** 
 (0.352)  (0.000) 
AV_TAX  D1. -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.856) (0.564) (0.697) 
CIT D1. -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.191) (0.076) (0.054) 
PIT D1. -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.298) (0.028) (0.253) 
R-squared 0.179 0.336 0.429  
Obs 459 187 187 
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